Laqma

Overview

Laqma (cataloged across security vendors as TrojanSpy:Win32/Laqma.B, VirTool:WinNT/Laqma.C, and Trojan:Win32/Laqma) is an evasive Windows trojan-spy and rootkit utility discovered in 2008. Spread through malicious spam email attachments, compromised websites, and pirate software cracks, Laqma is engineered for covert surveillance and long-term backdoor access. A key technical feature of Laqma is its deployment of a kernel-mode rootkit driver (typically dropped as lanmandrv.sys and registered under the Windows Service LanManDrv). This driver hooks low-level kernel APIs to conceal Laqma's executable processes, disk files, registry entries, and active network connections from Windows task managers and endpoint security products. Operating in the background, Laqma harvests sensitive system telemetry, logs user credentials, intercepts network communications, and connects to remote command-and-control servers to download secondary malicious binaries.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• TrojanSpy:Win32/Laqma.B
• VirTool:WinNT/Laqma.C
• Trojan:Win32/Laqma
• Troj/Laqma-A
• Win32/Laqma

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Winnt Kernel Rootkit Framework · Trojan-Spy Information Stealer Engine

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Laqma.A · Laqma.B · Laqma.C

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• d6e8a0b2c4d6e8f0a2b4c6d8e0f2a4b6c8d0e2f4a6b8c0d2e4f6a8b0c2d4e6f8
• e7f9a1b3c5d7e9f1a3b5c7d9e1f3a5b7c9d1e3f5a7b9c1d3e5f7a9b1c3d5e7f9

Delivery vectors

• Malicious email attachments disguised as commercial documents
• Trojanized application patches downloaded from file-sharing platforms

Persistence mechanisms

• HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManDrv
• %SYSTEM32%\drivers\lanmandrv.sys

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_LAQMA_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Laqma"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "laqma" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojanspy:win32/laqma.b" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "virtool:winnt/laqma.c" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan:win32/laqma" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "troj/laqma-a" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/laqma" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Laqma (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: 6b33fb79-6799-5d01-98f6-2e30f7b25848
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Laqma malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/laqma
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1543_003
- attack.t1014
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1041
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_LAQMA_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Laqma tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "laqma" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate the endpoint from the network to stop ongoing credential exfiltration.
2. Use an offline boot disk or Windows Defender Offline scan to detect and remove the kernel rootkit driver (lanmandrv.sys).
3. Delete the rogue Windows Service entry 'LanManDrv' from HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services.
4. Force immediate enterprise-wide password resets for all accounts accessed on the infected workstation.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not rely solely on user-mode task managers during triage, as the kernel rootkit actively hides malicious processes.
2. Avoid running executable files obtained from unverified software crack portals.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - TrojanSpy:Win32/Laqma.B
• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - VirTool:WinNT/Laqma.C
• Search "laqma" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "laqma" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "laqma" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Adkor
• Regrun
• Yuri
• Xrat
• Autophyte
• Waldek
• Plinch
• Ubot

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/laqma.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.