Ludbaruma

Overview

Ludbaruma (identified across antivirus products as Worm:Win32/Ludbaruma.A, Worm:Win32/Ludbaruma!pz, and TrojanDropper:Win32/Ludbaruma) is an aggressive Windows worm and screen-locking trojan family that emerged around 2012. Engineered to propagate rapidly across corporate local area networks and removable storage media, Ludbaruma copies its binary to network shares and USB thumb drives while dropping malicious LNK shortcut files that weaponize CVE-2010-2568. Upon initial infection, Ludbaruma copies itself into %TEMP% and %APPDATA%, creates registry autostart run keys, and terminates endpoint security tools. The malware features hybrid blocker capabilities, disabling the Windows Task Manager, Registry Editor, and Command Prompt to inhibit user remediation, while displaying fraudulent warning messages or locking the display. Ludbaruma also maintains C2 communications over HTTP to download secondary ransomware or trojan payloads.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Worm:Win32/Ludbaruma.A
• Worm:Win32/Ludbaruma!pz
• TrojanDropper:Win32/Ludbaruma
• Win32/Ludbaruma
• Ludbaruma.Worm

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Win32 Blocker & Worm Frameworks

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Ludbaruma.A · Ludbaruma.Blocker · Ludbaruma.Gen

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f
• 8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a

Delivery vectors

• Network share propagation leveraging malicious LNK files exploiting CVE-2010-2568
• Removable USB storage devices infected with automated worm droppers

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\LudbarumaWorm
• %TEMP%\ludbaruma_sys.exe

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_LUDBARUMA_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Ludbaruma"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "ludbaruma" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "worm:win32/ludbaruma.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "worm:win32/ludbaruma!pz" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojandropper:win32/ludbaruma" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/ludbaruma" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "ludbaruma.worm" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Ludbaruma (Worm) Execution & Triage
id: 84a9ad9f-6b02-5ecf-9855-7c3e1c2684cc
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Ludbaruma malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/ludbaruma
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.worm
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1091
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_LUDBARUMA_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Ludbaruma tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "ludbaruma" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate the infected machine from the network immediately to prevent lateral spread across network shares.
2. Boot into Windows Safe Mode to bypass screen-locking routines and process protection.
3. Re-enable Task Manager and Registry Editor by modifying registry policies under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System.
4. Delete malicious binaries located in %TEMP% and %APPDATA%, and clean infected USB media.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not connect infected USB flash drives to uninfected administrative workstations.
2. Avoid leaving open write permissions on administrative network shares.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Worm:Win32/Ludbaruma.A
• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Worm:Win32/Ludbaruma!pz
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2010-2568
• Search "ludbaruma" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "ludbaruma" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "ludbaruma" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Worm)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Mogoogwi
• Vobfus
• Lovgate
• Mabezat
• Mira
• Lamer
• Mofksys
• Chindo

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/ludbaruma.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.