Rebhip

Overview

Worm:Win32/Rebhip is a stealthy dual-threat worm and keylogging trojan discovered in 2011 that proliferates via removable USB drives and unsecured local network shares. Rebhip utilizes the Windows Shell shortcut deception technique: it sets the hidden system attribute (+h +s) on legitimate user directories and creates malicious .lnk shortcut files using identical folder icons pointing to the Rebhip binary. Once executed on a target host, Rebhip injects into svchost.exe, achieves persistence via the Run registry key, hooks user keystrokes, and periodically transmits stolen corporate credentials and system reconnaissance data to remote C2 servers over HTTP while receiving secondary download instructions.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Rebhip
• Worm:Win32/Rebhip
• W32/Rebhip
• Trojan.Rebhip
• Worm.Win32.Rebhip
• Rebhip.A
• Rebhip.B

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Global Cybercrime Groups High confidence
  Basis:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Rebhip.A (2011) · Rebhip.B (2012) · Rebhip Lnk Shortcut Variant

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 8a7b6c5d4e3f2019827364510293847561029384756102938475610293847561
• 1928374650192837465019283746501928374650192837465019283746501928

Delivery vectors

• usb_shortcut_propagation
• shared_network_folders

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
• svchost.exe Process Injection

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_REBHIP_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Rebhip"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "rebhip" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "rebhip" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "worm:win32/rebhip" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "w32/rebhip" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan.rebhip" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "worm.win32.rebhip" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "rebhip.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s8 = "rebhip.b" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Rebhip (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 4455a3c7-67dd-57a1-9d06-5ff6f4efe3e5
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Rebhip malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
  Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/rebhip
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1091
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1564_001
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1055
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_REBHIP_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Rebhip tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "rebhip" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disable AutoRun and AutoPlay policies across all domain endpoints via Group Policy (GPO).
2. Audit removable USB media for hidden folders and malicious .lnk shortcuts.
3. Terminate injected svchost.exe processes exhibiting unauthorized outbound HTTP connections.
4. Deploy security patches addressing Windows Shell shortcut vulnerability CVE-2010-2568.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not double-click suspicious folder shortcuts appearing on USB removable drives.
2. Avoid operating endpoints with disabled visibility for hidden system files and extensions.
3. Never permit unrestricted USB flash drive usage in high-security network segments.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Security Intelligence: Worm:Win32/Rebhip.A Advisory
• Symantec Security Center: Trojan.Rebhip Threat Assessment
• NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2010-2568
• Search "rebhip" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "rebhip" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "rebhip" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Bifrost
• Bladabindi
• Mokes
• Houndhack
• Netbus
• Remcos
• Ircbot
• Ghost

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/rebhip.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.