Hematite

Overview

Hematite (tracked across threat intelligence feeds as Win.Virus.Hematite, Trojan.Hematite, and Trojan:Win32/Hematite!rfn) is a dual-capability Windows file infector and trojan loader documented by Cisco Talos and Microsoft Defender. The malware is engineered to systematically scan compromised local storage drives and mounted network shares for portable executable (.exe) files. Upon identifying candidate binaries, Hematite appends an encrypted shellcode block—typically around 3,000 bytes—to the final PE section and modifies the Optional Header's AddressOfEntryPoint to redirect initial process execution into the malicious shellcode. After running its payload in memory, Hematite jumps back to the original entry point (OEP), allowing the host program to launch normally to evade user suspicion. Beyond parasitic infection, Hematite acts as a modular stager, initiating outbound HTTP beaconing to download secondary banking trojans, information stealers, and ransomware loaders onto infected enterprise endpoints.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Win.Virus.Hematite
• Trojan.Hematite
• Trojan:Win32/Hematite!rfn
• Virus:Win32/Hematite.A
• Win32/Hematite

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Win32_Pe_Infector_Engine

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Hematite.A · Hematite!Rfn

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 4a8b7f1e9c2d3a5e8b0c1f2e4d6a7b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a
• 9e8d7c6b5a4f3e2d1c0b9a8f7e6d5c4b3a2f1e0d9c8b7a6f5e4d3c2b1a0f9e8d

Delivery vectors

• Weaponized RTF and Word document email attachments exploiting CVE-2017-11882
• Infected portable executables distributed via compromised file-sharing portals

Persistence mechanisms

• PE section header modification and AddressOfEntryPoint redirection
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\HematiteHost

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_HEMATITE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Hematite"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "hematite" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "win.virus.hematite" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan.hematite" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan:win32/hematite!rfn" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "virus:win32/hematite.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/hematite" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Hematite (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: d0bc5042-fd52-52c7-9267-b29d037f0060
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Hematite malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/hematite
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1574_002
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1082
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_HEMATITE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Hematite tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "hematite" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate the compromised endpoint from the network to sever the attacker's interactive, remote-control session.
2. Capture a full forensic memory image of the machine to extract the decrypted Hematite payload and its C2 configuration.
3. Identify the specific C2 IP address and implement immediate blocks at the perimeter firewall and proxy servers.
4. Perform a clean OS rebuild and force password resets for all accounts that accessed the machine, assuming total endpoint compromise.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not leave the machine connected to the network during triage; the attacker has live access and will likely destroy evidence or move laterally.
2. Avoid relying solely on static signatures to detect Hematite, as it is frequently re-packed and obfuscated for each targeted campaign.

References & External Analysis

• Cisco Talos Threat Intelligence - Win.Virus.Hematite Advisory
• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/Hematite!rfn
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-11882
• Search "hematite" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "hematite" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "hematite" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Amavaldo
• Ursnifdropper
• Pcfixer
• Gamevance
• Picsys
• Genericrxfy
• Alnaddy
• Wswhacker

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/hematite.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.