Aliser

Category: file_infector · Aliases: Win32/Aliser, Virus:Win32/Aliser, Aliser.7825, Virus.Win32.Aliser, Win32.Aliser.A · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 52 · Enrichment: curated_sourced · Updated: 2026-10-15
Category: File_InfectorStatus: Automated SignatureFirst seen: 2004Motivation: System Disruption, Parasitic Infection & Network Lateral Spread🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows XP, Windows 2000, Windows 7
Executive Summary
Aliser (cataloged across antivirus vendors and historical academic research under classifications including Win32/Aliser, Virus:Win32/Aliser, and Aliser.7825) is a classic polymorphic Windows PE file infector and parasitic trojan active since 2004.

Table of Contents

Overview

Aliser (cataloged across antivirus vendors and historical academic research under classifications including Win32/Aliser, Virus:Win32/Aliser, and Aliser.7825) is a classic polymorphic Windows PE file infector and parasitic trojan active since 2004. Engineered to achieve deep system compromise and self-preservation, Aliser scans local fixed disks and accessible network shares for valid Portable Executable (PE) files. When target executables are discovered, Aliser appends its encrypted polymorphic body to the final section of the binary, patches the entry point to divert execution flow through its decryption routine, and preserves the original host code to avoid immediate user detection. Additionally, Aliser drops auxiliary backdoor utilities into system directories, modifies registry boot values, and attempts to suppress local antivirus monitors.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Virus:Win32/Aliser.A · Aliser.7825

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1027 · T1547.001 · T1082 · T1105

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-BDABinary De-obfuscation & UnpackingAnalyzeT1027Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation.
D3-SDASystem Discovery AnalysisDetectT1082Alert on rapid enumerations of systeminfo, hostname, and registry hardware trees in short intervals.
D3-NTINetwork Traffic InspectionDetectT1105Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols.
D3-RPMRegistry Persistence MonitoringDetectT1547.001Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management.

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_ALISER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Aliser"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "aliser" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "win32/aliser" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "virus:win32/aliser" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "aliser.7825" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "virus.win32.aliser" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32.aliser.a" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Aliser (File Infector) Execution & Triage
id: 10a76a8c-aecc-55c0-81ff-ba82835e1919
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Aliser malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/aliser
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.file-infector
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_ALISER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Aliser tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "aliser" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

References & External Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Virus:Win32/Aliser?

Aliser is a classic polymorphic Windows PE file infector that parasitically infects executables on local and shared drives.

How does Aliser infect clean Windows executable files?

It appends its polymorphic code to target PE sections and redirects the Original Entry Point (OEP) to its decryptor.

Does Aliser propagate across local network shares?

Yes, Aliser enumerates mapped and accessible network shares to infect clean binaries across organizational subnets.

Why is Aliser designated as polymorphic?

Its decryption engine mutates with each infection iteration, changing its cryptographic keys and code structure.

How can systems infected with Aliser be disinfected?

Use a specialized bootable antivirus rescue disk to repair infected PE files and restore modified system executables.

How do I remove Aliser from Windows?

Manual removal of Aliser is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

What are the main symptoms of a Aliser infection?

Symptoms of Aliser can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against File_Infectors

Want to prevent Aliser and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Think You've Been Hacked? What To Do First.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/aliser.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.