Indigorose

Overview

Executive Summary

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

• File Extraction and Execution: The compiled executable acts as a sophisticated "dropper" or binder. It silently extracts embedded files (the actual malware payload, such as a RAT or info-stealer) to temporary directories (e.g., `%TEMP%`).
• Scripted Automation: The attacker utilizes the legitimate scripting capabilities of AutoPlay Media Studio (Lua-based) to automate the execution of the extracted malware, modify registry keys, or even disable specific security services before the payload runs.
• Evasion by Association: Because the outer executable is compiled by a legitimate commercial tool, it often bypasses simplistic antivirus heuristics that are looking for standard malware packing techniques (like UPX).

Threat Assessment

Incident Response and Remediation

• Do Not Execute: If a suspicious IndigoRose executable (often disguised as a document or a "Setup.exe") is discovered, do not run it. Isolate the file immediately.
• Forensic Unpacking: Security analysts must use specialized tools to unpack the IndigoRose container and analyze the embedded files and the internal Lua scripts to determine the true nature of the payload.
• Network Isolation: If the file was inadvertently executed, immediately isolate the endpoint and perform a deep forensic scan to locate and eradicate the extracted secondary malware.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Riskware.IndigoRose
• Dropper.AutoPlay
• Win32/AutoPlay.Suspicious

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_INDIGOROSE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Indigorose"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "indigorose" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "riskware.indigorose" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "dropper.autoplay" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/autoplay.suspicious" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Indigorose (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: eafbe69e-e3ac-53c8-b9a0-3b16b9e047c3
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Indigorose malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary
  user directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/indigorose
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1204_002
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_INDIGOROSE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Indigorose tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "indigorose" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Sever network connectivity for the flagged endpoint to terminate persistent command-and-control (C2) communication channels and stop Indigorose from retrieving secondary stage payloads.
2. Capture process memory triage to detect and terminate malicious threads injected by Indigorose into legitimate system processes such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe.
3. Audit Windows Registry Run keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) and Task Scheduler entries to locate and purge Indigorose persistence hooks.
4. Deploy updated enterprise EDR detection signatures and conduct an out-of-band endpoint scan to isolate dropped binaries and staged payloads.
5. Rotate all credentials, domain user passwords, and session cookies active on the system during the Indigorose execution timeframe.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Indigorose dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Indigorose until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "indigorose" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "indigorose" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "indigorose" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Evital
• Maplestory
• Imminent
• Genericrxbg
• Wakme
• Winshell
• Dovs
• Wrar

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/indigorose.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.