Darkgate

Overview

DarkGate is an evasive, commercial Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) loader and remote access platform developed by a cybercriminal known as 'RastaFarEye'. Active privately since 2018, DarkGate transitioned to high-volume underground commercial rental in mid-2023 following the disruption of Qakbot, charging affiliates up to $100,000 annually. DarkGate is engineered with advanced defensive evasion capabilities, employing AutoIt script interpreters, multi-stage VBScript / HTA droppers, and DLL side-loading using legitimate signed binaries. It features hidden VNC for remote desktop surveillance, cryptocurrency wallet theft, browser credential extraction, reverse proxy tunneling, and arbitrary payload execution. DarkGate is delivered via malvertising (Google Ads hijacking for products like AnyDesk, Advanced IP Scanner), compromised Microsoft Teams phishing messages delivering malicious LNK files, and weaponized PDF/Excel attachments. In 2024, CISA and international cybersecurity partners issued multiple joint advisories detailing DarkGate's role as an initial access broker for enterprise ransomware syndicates including BlackCat/ALPHV and Quantum.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• DarkGate
• meh_crypter
• dark_gate
• Win32/DarkGate
• DarkGate RAT

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• RastaFarEye (Developer) High confidence
  Basis:
• Underground MaaS Affiliates High confidence
  Basis:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Darkgate V3 (2018) · Darkgate V4 (Autoit Pro) · Darkgate V5 (Commercial Maas 2023-2024)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1566.002: Inspect email links for known malicious domains and use link-rewriting services for time-of-click analysis.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2023-36025 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2024-21412 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 2f82ba1851b415a782bca8ca2107455cf6433ae6506fbc3b53f0fa752243d467
• 7c58ab7df0c8f5379b1836171a4f00843657b8599426f8d0ab7cfeb702221b6c

Delivery vectors

• malvertising
• teams_phishing
• weaponized_lnk

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
• Scheduled Tasks

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_DARKGATE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Darkgate"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "darkgate" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "darkgate" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "meh_crypter" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "dark_gate" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/darkgate" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "darkgate rat" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Darkgate (Loader) Execution & Triage
id: 12ee13cd-cb23-5418-9689-ad0d347bc242
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Darkgate malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/darkgate
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.loader
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055_001
- attack.t1574_002
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1566_002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_DARKGATE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Darkgate tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "darkgate" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Block execution of unapproved AutoIt interpreter runtimes and script extensions on endpoints.
2. Deploy endpoint detection rules to intercept unsigned DLLs loaded from user-writable directories (DLL side-loading).
3. Restrict outbound network traffic to newly registered domains and known DarkGate C2 endpoints.
4. Apply security updates addressing Windows SmartScreen bypass vulnerabilities CVE-2023-36025 and CVE-2024-21412.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow users to download corporate utility software via unsponsored search engine advertisements.
2. Avoid opening unverified LNK or VBS files received through collaborative messaging platforms (Teams/Skype).
3. Never whitelist entire temporary app directories from endpoint security scanning.

References & External Analysis

• CISA Alert: Threat Actors Exploiting DarkGate Malware
• Trellix Threat Labs: DarkGate Evolution Technical Analysis
• NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2023-36025
• Search "darkgate" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "darkgate" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "darkgate" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Loader)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Pikabot
• Bazarloader
• Smokeloader
• Nisloder
• Umbra
• Gamarue
• Emotet
• Bumblebee

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/darkgate.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.