Mofksys

Category: worm · Aliases: Worm:Win32/Mofksys, Trojan:Win32/Mofksys, Win32/Mofksys, Mofksys Worm, Worm.Mofksys · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 14 · Enrichment: curated_sourced · Updated: 2026-10-15
Category: WormStatus: Automated SignaturePlatform: WINDOWS_PEStage: Execution, Lateral MovementActor: Unknown / CybercriminalIndustry: Global / OpportunisticMotivation: Opportunistic🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows XP
Executive Summary
Mofksys (classified as Worm:Win32/Mofksys across Microsoft Defender, Sophos, and Kaspersky) is an evasive network and removable drive worm targeting Windows systems.

Table of Contents

Overview

Mofksys (classified as Worm:Win32/Mofksys across Microsoft Defender, Sophos, and Kaspersky) is an evasive network and removable drive worm targeting Windows systems. Mofksys spreads by copying itself to root directories of connected USB flash drives and external hard drives along with weaponized autorun.inf files or masqueraded LNK shortcut files. Once launched on a victim endpoint, Mofksys deploys Managed Object Format (MOF) files (.mof) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscriptions to achieve high-privilege persistent execution. Mofksys disables security monitoring tools, creates backdoors, and connects to remote command-and-control servers to download follow-on malicious payloads.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-NBANetwork Behavioral AnalysisDetectT1021.002Enforce SMB message signing, disable legacy SMBv1, and restrict administrative share access (C$, ADMIN$) to dedicated PAM bastion hosts.
D3-NDFNetwork Data FilteringIsolateT1048Inspect non-standard port traffic and block unauthorized ICMP or DNS tunneling protocols at the network perimeter.
D3-RMCRemovable Media Access ControlHardenT1091Enforce Group Policy settings disabling Windows autorun and block execution permissions on removable USB storage media.
D3-NTINetwork Traffic InspectionDetectT1105Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols.
D3-RPMRegistry Persistence MonitoringDetectT1547.001Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management.

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_MOFKSYS_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Mofksys"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "mofksys" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "worm:win32/mofksys" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan:win32/mofksys" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/mofksys" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "mofksys worm" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "worm.mofksys" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Mofksys (Worm) Execution & Triage
id: a762997d-8182-5a8b-9c85-26b68f3e188b
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Mofksys malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/mofksys
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.worm
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1091
- attack.t1546_003
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_MOFKSYS_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Mofksys tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "mofksys" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

Containment & Response Steps

Home Users: If you suspect a malware infection on your personal device, disconnect from the internet immediately and run a full system scan with your antivirus software (see our TotalAV Antivirus & Security Support Guide). The steps below are intended for IT professionals responding to enterprise incidents.

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

  1. Disconnect the infected machine from the local network and internet immediately to halt the worm's lateral movement and data exfiltration.
  2. Disable AutoRun/AutoPlay across the organization to prevent the worm from executing via infected USB drives.
  3. Perform a full system scan with an updated enterprise antivirus solution, booting into Safe Mode if necessary to bypass active rootkits.
  4. Change all user credentials and administrative passwords that were stored or used on the infected system, as they may have been compromised.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

  1. Do not connect any USB drives or external storage to the infected system until it has been completely sanitized.
  2. Do not assume only one machine is infected; worms spread rapidly, so you must sweep the entire network for IoCs.

References & External Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Worm:Win32/Mofksys?

Mofksys is a worm that spreads via USB removable drives and leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI/MOF) for persistence.

How does Mofksys spread via USB drives?

It copies hidden executables to removable storage and creates autorun.inf or deceptive shortcut (.lnk) files to trigger execution.

How does Mofksys use WMI/MOF files for persistence?

It compiles custom MOF scripts into the WMI repository to execute its payload whenever system events trigger.

What backdoor capabilities does Mofksys possess?

It contacts remote C2 servers to receive arbitrary commands, execute secondary scripts, and download follow-on trojans.

How do defenders remediate Mofksys infections?

Clean the infected USB drives, purge malicious WMI event filters and consumers using PowerShell, and run an updated antimalware scan.

How do I remove the Mofksys Worm from Windows?

Manual removal of Mofksys is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

Is Mofksys a virus or a Worm?

Mofksys is classified as a Worm. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Mofksys typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.

What are the main symptoms of a Mofksys infection?

Symptoms of Mofksys can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against Worms

Want to prevent Mofksys and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Worm & Virus Protection.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/mofksys.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.