Chindo

Overview

Chindo (cataloged in security vendor threat telemetry under signatures including Worm:Win32/Chindo, Trojan:Win32/Chindo, and Worm:Win32/Chindo.SQ!MTB) is a hybrid Windows worm and backdoor first detected in 2012. Designed to achieve rapid lateral movement across unsegmented local networks, Chindo interrogates local network configuration, scans for accessible administrative and SMB file shares, and copies its executable payload disguised as common document and utility files. Furthermore, Chindo infects connected removable storage drives (USB thumb drives) by generating autorun.inf files and deceptive shortcut LNK files. Once executed on a compromised endpoint, Chindo registers autostart entries in the Windows Registry, connects to attacker-controlled command-and-control servers, and downloads secondary malware payloads including keystroke loggers, credential stealers, and remote access backdoors.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Worm:Win32/Chindo
• Trojan:Win32/Chindo
• Win32/Chindo
• Worm:Win32/Chindo.SQ!MTB

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Generic Win32 Worms

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Chindo.A · Chindo.Sq!Mtb

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b
• 2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a

Delivery vectors

• usb_setup.exe
• network_share_doc.exe

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ChindoWorm
• %AppData%\Chindo\chindo_svc.exe

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_CHINDO_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Chindo"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "chindo" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "worm:win32/chindo" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan:win32/chindo" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/chindo" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "worm:win32/chindo.sq!mtb" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Chindo (Worm) Execution & Triage
id: 4ae56076-97a9-5595-9844-f39e6b402809
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Chindo malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/chindo
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.worm
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1021_002
- attack.t1091
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_CHINDO_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Chindo tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "chindo" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Quarantine the endpoint to halt the active exfiltration of browsing telemetry and the downloading of further adware modules.
2. Audit Windows Group Policies and the Registry to remove any forced extension installation policies (ExtensionInstallForcelist) created by the adware.
3. Deploy an enterprise adware removal tool (e.g., AdwCleaner) to locate and strip the deeply embedded registry hooks and watchdog services.
4. Force a complete reset of all installed web browsers to factory defaults to eradicate the rogue extensions and restore the homepage.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not rely solely on the browser's 'remove extension' button; Chindo frequently uses GPOs and watchdog services to immediately reinstall itself.
2. Avoid ignoring the infection; adware tracking data is highly detailed and may expose corporate activities or access to internal portals.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Worm:Win32/Chindo
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - WORM_CHINDO.A
• Search "chindo" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "chindo" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "chindo" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Worm)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Beebone
• Xorer
• Brontok
• Sytro
• Warezov
• Ludbaruma
• Mira
• Kolabc

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/chindo.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.