Clipbanker
Table of Contents
Overview
Clipbanker (extensively cataloged across threat intelligence databases and antivirus vendors under signatures including Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClipBanker, Trojan:Win32/ClipBanker, and Trojan.ClipBanker) is a notorious family of financial trojans and cryptocurrency clipboard hijackers active since 2015. Operating silently on infected endpoints, Clipbanker monitors the Windows clipboard using native API hooks (SetClipboardViewer or AddClipboardFormatListener). Whenever a user copies a string of text, Clipbanker runs regular expression algorithms to detect cryptocurrency wallet addresses (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero, Litecoin, Ripple) or European bank account numbers (IBANs). The moment a target address is detected, Clipbanker instantly substitutes it with a preconfigured attacker-controlled wallet or account address. Because users rarely verify every character of long hexadecimal crypto addresses before clicking 'Send', funds are irreversibly transferred directly to the threat actor.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Trojan-Banker.Win32.Clipbanker.A · Trojan-Banker.Win32.Clipbanker.Gen · Cryptoclipbanker
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1115 · T1547.001 · T1082 · T1027 · T1071.001
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-BDA | Binary De-obfuscation & Unpacking | Analyze | T1027 | Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation. |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-SDA | System Discovery Analysis | Detect | T1082 | Alert on rapid enumerations of systeminfo, hostname, and registry hardware trees in short intervals. |
D3-CAC | Clipboard Access Control | Isolate | T1115 | Isolate virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) clipboards and alert on rapid background clipboard querying by non-foreground processes. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_CLIPBANKER_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Clipbanker"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "trojan-banker.win32.clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan:win32/clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "trojan.clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "win32/clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "clipbanker.gen" ascii wide nocase
$s7 = "trojan-banker:win32/clipbanker.a" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Clipbanker (Banking Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: afec24a9-d16d-5361-9521-8b4b76448264
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Clipbanker malware family. Detects recon staging, certutil file payload
staging, and web-inject process proxying characteristic of banking trojan initial
loaders.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/clipbanker
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/banking-trojan-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.banking-trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1115
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \svchost.exe
- \explorer.exe
- \msiexec.exe
- \certutil.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- -urlcache
- -split -f
- ipconfig /all
- route print
- netstat -ano
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_CLIPBANKER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Clipbanker tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
References & External Analysis
- Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan-Banker:Win32/ClipBanker
- Kaspersky Securelist - Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClipBanker Analysis
- Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence - Trojan.ClipBanker
- Search "clipbanker" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "clipbanker" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "clipbanker" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClipBanker?
Clipbanker is a clipboard-hijacking trojan that replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses and bank account numbers with attacker-controlled destinations.
How does Clipbanker steal cryptocurrency funds?
It intercepts Windows clipboard operations in real time using regex matching, swapping the victim's intended destination wallet address with an attacker wallet during copy-paste.
What cryptocurrency formats does Clipbanker target?
It commonly targets Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), Litecoin (LTC), Monero (XMR), Ripple (XRP), and European IBAN bank accounts.
Why is Clipbanker difficult for users to notice?
It generates virtually zero CPU overhead, does not display any user interface, and relies on users failing to double-check long cryptographic strings before approving transfers.
How can users protect cryptocurrency transactions from Clipbanker?
Always verify the first and last five characters of crypto wallet addresses before sending, use hardware wallets with on-device address confirmation, and maintain updated antivirus protection.
How do I remove Clipbanker from Windows?
Manual removal of Clipbanker is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
What are the main symptoms of a Clipbanker infection?
Symptoms of Clipbanker can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Banking_Trojans
Want to prevent Clipbanker and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Banking Trojan Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/clipbanker.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.