Equationdrug

Overview

Trojan:Win32/EquationDrug is a state-of-the-art cyber-espionage platform attributed by global threat intelligence researchers to the Equation Group (associated with US NSA Tailored Access Operations). First publicly documented by Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) in February 2015, EquationDrug operated actively from 2010 through 2013 as the direct operational predecessor to the GrayFish platform. EquationDrug represents one of the most sophisticated modular cyber-espionage frameworks ever uncovered, featuring a custom kernel-mode rootkit architecture, an encrypted virtual file system (VFS) hidden within Windows Registry hives, and over 116 dynamic plugin modules. The malware includes specialized modules for reprogramming hard disk drive firmware across more than a dozen major HDD manufacturing architectures (including Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor, and Toshiba), creating persistent forensic-resistant sectors. EquationDrug utilized zero-day exploits including CVE-2010-2568 (LNK shortcut vulnerability, also utilized in Stuxnet) and CVE-2013-3881 (win32k.sys privilege escalation). The platform performed targeted surveillance against aerospace, nuclear research, military, and telecommunications organizations across Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Syria.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• EquationDrug
• Trojan.EquationDrug
• Win32/EquationDrug

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Equation Group High confidence
  Basis:
• Tailored Access Operations (TAO) High confidence
  Basis:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Doublefantasy

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Equationdrug V1.X · Equationdrug Kernel Rootkit (Nls_933W.Dll) · Grayfish (Successor)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2013-3881 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 7aa99c43e120ea96847cbb6509ec254388e6cc810e9c60e34b9d0317e0b5de78
• 37f26792a95c3702a4bf702a837774bb9f1a0d33e9b1d9bf5bdf41b9e2c6c06a

Delivery vectors

• targeted_exploit_delivery
• interdicted_media

Persistence mechanisms

• Signed Kernel Driver
• HDD Firmware Re-flash
• Registry Virtual File System

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_EQUATIONDRUG_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Equationdrug"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "equationdrug" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "equationdrug" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan.equationdrug" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/equationdrug" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Equationdrug (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: abe413e5-7f64-598b-bf64-b9c97ec95466
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Equationdrug malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/equationdrug
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1542_002
- attack.t1014
- attack.t1070_004
- attack.t1005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_EQUATIONDRUG_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Equationdrug tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "equationdrug" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Decommission compromised hardware systems where storage device firmware may have been overwritten.
2. Deploy memory analysis tools (e.g. Volatility) to inspect unlinked kernel drivers and hooked SSDT tables.
3. Block outbound communications matching Equation C2 domain conventions and raw socket behaviors.
4. Implement secure UEFI boot enforcement and hardware root-of-trust verification across critical infrastructure.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume operating system formatting removes firmware-level rootkit implants.
2. Avoid deploying sensitive systems on unpatched legacy operating systems lacking Driver Signature Enforcement.
3. Never insert untrusted USB removable media into air-gapped critical networks.

References & External Analysis

• Kaspersky Lab GReAT: Equation Group Questions and Answers
• Kaspersky Report: Inside EquationDrug Espionage Platform
• NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2010-2568
• Search "equationdrug" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "equationdrug" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "equationdrug" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Advanced Threat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Slingshot
• Rubar
• Gaofenquming
• Speed
• Yahlover
• Instally
• Easyspeedcheck
• Hostschanger

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/equationdrug.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.