Wannacry

Overview

WannaCry (cataloged across security vendors and intelligence agencies as WanaCrypt0r, WCry, WannaCrypt, and Ransom.WannaCry) is an unprecedented global ransomware worm that broke out on May 12, 2017, infecting hundreds of thousands of computers across more than 150 countries within hours. Attributed by the US Department of Justice and international intelligence agencies to North Korea's Lazarus Group, WannaCry weaponized the EternalBlue SMBv1 remote code execution exploit (CVE-2017-0144) and DoublePulsar backdoor toolkit—originally leaked from the Equation Group. Once executed on a single network endpoint, WannaCry self-propagated autonomously across internal subnets and the public internet by probing TCP port 445 for vulnerable SMB services. On infected machines, WannaCry encrypted user files using AES-128 and RSA-2048 encryption, appending the .WNCRY extension, dropping ransom notes (WanaDecryptor), and demanding $300 to $600 in Bitcoin. The epidemic was famously curtailed when security researcher Marcus Hutchins discovered and registered an unregistered killswitch domain hardcoded into the binary.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• WannaCry
• WanaCrypt0r
• WCry
• WannaCrypt
• WanaCrypt0r 2.0
• Ransom.WannaCry

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Equation Group Fuzzbunch · Eternalblue Exploitation Framework

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Wannacry 1.0 · Wanacrypt0R 2.0 · Wannacry Killswitch Variant

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-0144 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-0145 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• ed01ebf8304d164ff5fe90222e3e5fc132e169a4ccdd6e5e30e3f90fb1b49c71
• 24d004a104d4d54034dbcffc2a4b19a11f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c

Delivery vectors

• Autonomous lateral propagation via SMBv1 EternalBlue exploit targeting TCP port 445
• DoublePulsar kernel-level implant installation delivering the WannaCry dropper

Persistence mechanisms

• Windows Service: mssecsvc2.0 (display name 'Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service')
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WanaDecryptor

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_WANNACRY_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Wannacry"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "wannacry" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "wannacry" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "wanacrypt0r" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "wcry" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "wannacrypt" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "wanacrypt0r 2.0" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "ransom.wannacry" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Wannacry (Ransomware Worm) Execution & Triage
id: df66d53e-9fa8-57d3-9efe-92ed860aa08a
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Wannacry malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/wannacry
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware-worm
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1210
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_WANNACRY_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Wannacry tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "wannacry" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate all infected and vulnerable Windows hosts from internal and external networks immediately.
2. Block inbound and outbound TCP port 445 (SMB) across all network firewalls and router interfaces.
3. Terminate active WannaCry encryption processes and kill mssecsvc.exe and tasksche.exe.
4. Deploy Microsoft security update MS17-010 to patch SMBv1 vulnerabilities across all endpoints.
5. Ensure sinkhole DNS resolutions for the hardcoded killswitch domain are permitted out to the internet.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow SMBv1 protocol to remain enabled in modern enterprise infrastructure.
2. Avoid leaving port 445 exposed directly to the public internet.
3. Do not sinkhole the killswitch domain internally with NXDOMAIN responses, which would trigger live payload detonation.

References & External Analysis

• CISA Alert TA17-132A - Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-0144
• MITRE ATT&CK Software Profile - WannaCry (S0366)
• CISA Advisory: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2017/05/12/multiple-ransomware-infections-reported
• Search "wannacry" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "wannacry" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "wannacry" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2017/05/12/multiple-ransomware-infections-reported ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Pycrypter
• Lyposit
• Gimemo
• Genericrxbp
• Tvido
• Offend
• Ezoons
• Frosparf

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/wannacry.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.