Xmrig

Overview

XMRig (cataloged across antivirus vendors as Coinminer:Win32/XMRig, Trojan.XMRig, and Riskware.XMRig) is a high-performance open-source Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency miner that is routinely weaponized and covertly deployed by cybercriminal botnets. While developed as a legitimate mining utility for CPU and GPU architectures, threat actors integrate XMRig into unauthorized cryptojacking campaigns, exploiting endpoint vulnerabilities or bundling the binary into pirated software installers. Once silently installed on a target host, XMRig establishes background persistence via scheduled tasks and Windows services, obfuscates its process name to masquerade as legitimate Windows processes (such as svchost.exe or system.exe), and uses system API calls to monitor user idle times. During idle periods, XMRig consumes 100% of available CPU cores to mine Monero, routing hash shares to remote mining pools via encrypted stratum protocols over TCP, leading to extreme hardware throttling, power consumption spikes, and endpoint unresponsiveness.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Coinminer:Win32/XMRig
• Trojan.XMRig
• Win32/XMRig
• XMRig Miner
• XMRig Monero Miner

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Open Source Cryptomining Software

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Xmrig Cpu Miner · Xmrig Cuda · Xmrig Hidden Miner

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• c13a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a
• 7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a

Delivery vectors

• Trojanized software packages and pirate software installers distributed via P2P
• Remote exploitation of unpatched server applications delivering automated shell droppers

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\XMRigMiner
• Scheduled Task: Microsoft\Windows\PowerEfficiency\XMRigTask

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_XMRIG_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Xmrig"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "xmrig" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "coinminer:win32/xmrig" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan.xmrig" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/xmrig" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "xmrig miner" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "xmrig monero miner" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Xmrig (Cryptominer) Execution & Triage
id: e48325b7-ddb7-53ab-92c9-d846fd48c911
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Xmrig malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/xmrig
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.cryptominer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1496
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_XMRIG_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Xmrig tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "xmrig" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Terminate active XMRig mining processes and identify parent injector scripts.
2. Block outbound network connections to public Monero mining pools and Stratum protocol ports (such as 3333, 4444, and 5555).
3. Delete scheduled tasks and registry autostart keys configured for the miner.
4. Remove configuration files (config.json) containing attacker wallet addresses and pool credentials.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not permit unauthorized executable binaries to run with maximum CPU scheduling priority.
2. Avoid downloading untrusted game mods, cracks, or cryptocurrency utilities from third-party forums.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Coinminer:Win32/XMRig
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - Coinminer.Win32.XMRIG
• Search "xmrig" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "xmrig" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "xmrig" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Cryptominer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Tiggre
• Neksminer
• Maener
• Coins

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/xmrig.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.