Tiggre

Overview

Trojan:Win32/Tiggre!rfn (widely recognized across Microsoft Defender and endpoint telemetry as CoinMiner.Tiggre, Trojan.Tiggre, or Win32/Tiggre) is a prolific, evasive cryptojacking trojan and miner loader designed to stealthily hijack host CPU and GPU resources to mine Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency. Commonly wrapping optimized open-source XMRig mining code inside heavily obfuscated, multi-layered packers, Tiggre is distributed through pirated software releases, game cracks, keygens, and malicious torrent archives. Upon execution, Tiggre disables Windows Defender real-time scanning by modifying Group Policy and Windows Security registry keys, injects its mining threads into legitimate system binaries (such as svchost.exe, notepad.exe, or RuntimeBroker.exe), and dynamically throttles CPU consumption during user interaction or when Task Manager is launched to evade human detection.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Tiggre
• Trojan:Win32/Tiggre!rfn
• CoinMiner.Tiggre
• Trojan.Tiggre
• Win32/Tiggre
• Tiggre Miner
• Trojan:Win32/Tiggre

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Xmrig Open-Source Monero Mining Engine

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Trojan:Win32/Tiggre!Rfn · Coinminer:Win32/Tiggre.A · Trojan:Win32/Tiggre.B

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• f3b9c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef012345678
• 1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef

Delivery vectors

• Trojanized video game cracks and trainers
• Pirated software installers and keygens
• Malicious torrent downloads

Persistence mechanisms

• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WindowsSoundDevice
• Scheduled Task configured to launch miner under SYSTEM context

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_TIGGRE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Tiggre"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "tiggre" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "tiggre" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan:win32/tiggre!rfn" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "coinminer.tiggre" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan.tiggre" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/tiggre" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "tiggre miner" ascii wide nocase
        $s8 = "trojan:win32/tiggre" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Tiggre (Cryptominer) Execution & Triage
id: ef6c3fdb-3f80-5c40-93d6-4d859d9ee986
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Tiggre malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/tiggre
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.cryptominer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1496
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1057
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_TIGGRE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Tiggre tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "tiggre" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Sever outbound connections to known mining pools (Stratum protocol ports such as 3333, 4444, 5555) to stop unauthorized cryptocurrency mining by Tiggre.
2. Identify and terminate CPU/GPU-intensive background processes spawned by Tiggre, checking for masqueraded filenames (e.g., svchost.exe running from non-system directories).
3. Remove Scheduled Tasks and WMI event consumers that Tiggre uses to restart mining routines upon system idle states.
4. Inspect surrounding subnet nodes for automated lateral spreading via SMB exploits or SSH brute-forcing typical of cryptomining worms.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Tiggre dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Tiggre until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Trojan:Win32/Tiggre!rfn
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - CoinMiner.Win32.Tiggre
• Kaspersky Virus Encyclopedia - Trojan.Win32.Tiggre
• Search "tiggre" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "tiggre" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "tiggre" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Cryptominer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Neksminer
• Coins
• Maener
• Xmrig

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/tiggre.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.