Njrat
Table of Contents
Overview
njRAT (also tracked as Bladabindi, Njw0rm, and Backdoor:MSIL/Bladabindi) is a notorious, widely disseminated remote access trojan (RAT) developed in Microsoft Visual Basic .NET by a Kuwaiti threat actor known as 'njq8'. First surfacing in 2012 and publicly distributed across underground forums, njRAT became one of the most widespread commodity remote administration tools in the Middle East and worldwide. njRAT establishes persistent reverse TCP socket connections to operator command-and-control servers, utilizing dynamic DNS domains and communicating via custom plaintext protocols delimited by the string '|'|'|'. The trojan provides operators with extensive interactive surveillance and administrative control: it features real-time keystroke logging via the GetAsyncKeyState Windows API, live desktop screen streaming, webcam and microphone spying, arbitrary process execution via cmd.exe and PowerShell, file system manipulation, and automated credential theft from web browsers, FileZilla, and instant messaging clients. To evade detection, njRAT executes process hollowing (T1055.012) into trusted Windows processes (such as svchost.exe), modifies firewall rules via netsh, and adds itself to registry autostart keys. In June 2014, Microsoft and the FBI executed a landmark civil and criminal operation, seizing 22 dynamic DNS domains managed by No-IP (Vitalwerks) that were actively facilitating njRAT and Bladabindi botnets, accompanied by CISA Alert AA14-143A.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Njrat_V0.7D · Njw0Rm · Bladabindi
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1056.001 · T1113 · T1125 · T1123 · T1059.003 · T1071.001 · T1547.001 · T1555.003 · T1055.012
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
- T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
- T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.
- T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-PHA | Process Hollowing Analysis | Detect | T1055.012 | Inspect unbacked executable memory regions (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) for replaced PE image headers inside legitimate host processes. |
D3-MFA | Multi-factor Authentication | Harden | T1056.001 | Enforce FIDO2 / WebAuthn physical tokens to render keystroke-intercepted passwords useless. |
D3-PBA | Process Spawn Analysis | Detect | T1059.003 | Inspect command-line arguments and anomalous parent-child relationships spawning from cmd.exe. |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-SD | Screen Capture Detection | Detect | T1113 | Monitor desktop graphics API calls (BitBlt, GetDC) triggered by non-standard background threads. |
D3-HAC | Hardware Device Access Control | Isolate | T1125 | Enforce Group Policy hardware access restrictions on integrated webcams and microphones. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
D3-CVH | Credential Vault Hardening | Harden | T1555.003 | Enable DPAPI master key audit logging and isolate browser SQLite database files within virtualization-based security containers. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
4ffc186835a74659f170423c91465d3ec62b1e7c53d51786ce45464fb5f4581d1bc7ee24bf3692e8fa4c3f56ebc5970c40cebf656a1bce47b74f391152a4e98f
Delivery vectors
Malicious spam emails delivering weaponized Office documents exploiting CVE-2017-11882Spear-phishing archives with embedded LNK shortcuts or executable screensavers (.scr)P2P file sharing networks hosting cracked software and keygens bundled with njRAT
Persistence mechanisms
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run entry pointing to dropped .NET executableStartup folder shortcut under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartupProcess injection into svchost.exe to conceal running processes
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_NJRAT_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Njrat"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "njrat" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "bladabindi" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "njw0rm" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "backdoor:msil/bladabindi" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "trojan.msil.njrat" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "win32/bladabindi" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Njrat (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 7400cf07-bd99-5283-9bf8-80efd40c70a8
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Njrat malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/njrat
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1125
- attack.t1123
- attack.t1059_003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \reg.exe
- \schtasks.exe
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- \CurrentVersion\Run
- /create /tn
- bypass -enc
- net user /add
- net localgroup administrators
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_NJRAT_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Njrat tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "njrat" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
References & External Analysis
- CISA Alert AA14-143A: Technical Analysis of njRAT and Bladabindi
- Microsoft On the Issues: Cracking Down on Malicious Dynamic DNS Infrastructure
- Trend Micro: Dissecting the njRAT Remote Access Trojan
- CISA Advisory: AA14-143A
- Search "njrat" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "njrat" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "njrat" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: AA14-143A ↗
Frequently Asked Questions
What is njRAT and who created it?
njRAT is a .NET remote access trojan created by a Kuwaiti developer known as 'njq8'. Released around 2012, it was widely shared on cybercrime forums and used in both criminal activities and targeted regional espionage.
How does njRAT communicate with C2 servers?
njRAT connects via raw TCP sockets, using dynamic DNS services (such as No-IP) to route traffic, formatting commands and stolen data with a distinctive pipe-delimited string '|'|'|'.
What capabilities does njRAT possess?
njRAT includes full remote desktop control, webcam and microphone eavesdropping, keylogging, file transfer, registry editing, and password recovery from web browsers.
What was the 2014 Microsoft and FBI No-IP takedown?
In June 2014, Microsoft obtained a federal court order to seize 22 No-IP dynamic DNS domains that were routing traffic for over 7 million malicious connections, severely disrupting njRAT and Bladabindi botnets worldwide.
How do defenders detect njRAT network communications?
By inspecting network traffic for unencrypted TCP connections containing the signature '|'|'|' delimiter, monitoring process injection into svchost.exe, and tracking unauthorized Dynamic DNS outbound requests.
How do I remove the Njrat Rat from Windows?
Manual removal of Njrat is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Njrat a virus or a Rat?
Njrat is classified as a Rat. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Njrat typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Njrat infection?
Symptoms of Njrat can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Rats
Want to prevent Njrat and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Backdoor & RAT Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/njrat.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.