Pony

Overview

Pony (cataloged across cybersecurity authorities as Fareit, Siplog, Trojan:Win32/Fareit, and PWS:Win32/Fareit) is one of the most prolific commodity information stealers and trojan loaders in malware history. First observed in 2011, Pony was developed in C and assembly language, resulting in an exceptionally compact footprint (often under 50 KB). Pony specializes in harvesting stored credentials from over 100 applications, including major web browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer/Edge), FTP clients (FileZilla, Total Commander, WinSCP), email clients (Outlook, Thunderbird), and cryptocurrency wallet storage. In addition to mass credential harvesting, Pony functions as a versatile loader, downloading secondary payloads such as banking trojans (ZeuS, Gozi, Dridex) and ransomware onto compromised endpoints. Threat actors widely distribute Pony through malicious spam campaigns weaponized with Microsoft Office exploits such as CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2012-0158.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Fareit
• Siplog
• Trojan:Win32/Fareit
• PWS:Win32/Fareit
• Pony Stealer

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: C/Asm Modular Infostealer Engines

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Pony V1.9 · Pony V2.0 · Fareit Loader

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7
• 0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e

Delivery vectors

• Malspam campaigns delivering weaponized RTF documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882
• Phishing emails with ZIP archives containing obfuscated visual basic and executable droppers

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\PonyLoader
• Scheduled tasks created to periodically query C2 servers for updated payload execution

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_PONY_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Pony"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "pony" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "fareit" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "siplog" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan:win32/fareit" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "pws:win32/fareit" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "pony stealer" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Pony (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: 75d4c5dc-55d8-5338-b276-7c72baba398a
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Pony malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting, master
  key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/pony
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1552_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_PONY_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Pony tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "pony" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate compromised workstations immediately to prevent secondary ransomware or banking trojan payload drops.
2. Initiate an urgent, enterprise-wide password reset for all user accounts, web logins, and FTP/email credentials.
3. Terminate active Pony processes and inspect temporary directories for secondary executables.
4. Review firewall and proxy logs for HTTP POST requests delivering exfiltrated credential archives.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not delay credential revocation following a Pony detection, as stolen logins are rapidly sold on dark web marketplaces.
2. Avoid storing sensitive administrative and server credentials in unencrypted browser password stores.

References & External Analysis

• MITRE ATT&CK - Pony (Software S0453)
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan.Win32.FAREIT
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-0199
• Search "pony" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "pony" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "pony" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Infostealer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Bypass
• Lumma
• Usteal
• Berbew
• Azorult
• Socelars
• Browserpwdstealer
• Blackstealer

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/pony.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.