Gh0St

Overview

Gh0st RAT (also tracked as Ghost RAT, Backdoor.Gh0st, and Win32/Gh0st) is one of the most historically significant, modular, and widely weaponized Remote Access Trojans in cyber threat intelligence. Originally released in 2008 with public C++ source code by the Chinese hacker group C.Rufus Security Team, Gh0st RAT was rapidly adopted, customized, and deployed by dozens of advanced persistent threat (APT) groups—most notably APT27 (Emissary Panda), APT41 (Barium / Winnti), APT30, and the operators behind the global GhostNet cyber espionage network. Documented extensively by CISA (Alert AA20-258A and related joint cybersecurity advisories) and MITRE ATT&CK under software ID S0032, Gh0st RAT provides attackers with complete interactive control over compromised endpoints. Its capabilities include real-time remote desktop streaming, webcam and microphone hijacking, multi-process keylogging, full file system management, remote shell access, and encrypted C2 communication utilizing customized 5-byte packet magic headers (such as 'Gh0st', 'cb0st', 'kitty', and 'ly0st') followed by zlib-compressed payloads.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Gh0st RAT
• Backdoor.Gh0st
• Win32/Gh0st
• Ghost RAT
• Trojan.Win32.Gh0st
• Gh0st.C.Rufus

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: C.Rufus Security Team C++ Framework

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Gh0St Beta · Gh0St V3.6 · Nightdragon Gh0St · Cb0St Variant · Kitty Gh0St

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.
• T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2014-6332 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b
• 8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f

Delivery vectors

• Spear-phishing emails delivering weaponized Office documents exploiting CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-0199
• Watering hole attacks and DLL side-loading alongside legitimate signed software executables

Persistence mechanisms

• Windows service installed under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Gh0stService
• DLL search order hijacking in application runtime directories

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_GH0ST_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Gh0St"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "gh0st" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "gh0st rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "backdoor.gh0st" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/gh0st" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "ghost rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "trojan.win32.gh0st" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "gh0st.c.rufus" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Gh0st (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 3cae79df-f14f-5e06-b4a0-85e5aaa52c9e
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Gh0st malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
  Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/gh0st
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1125
- attack.t1123
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_GH0ST_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Gh0St tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "gh0st" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate compromised endpoints immediately to prevent lateral movement and real-time surveillance operations.
2. Deploy network intrusion detection (NIDS) signatures matching custom Gh0st 5-byte magic headers across egress firewalls.
3. Terminate active Gh0st RAT Windows services and purge registered DLL side-loading payloads.
4. Conduct full enterprise credential revamping and perform deep forensic memory triage to identify secondary implants.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not rely solely on default magic header strings ('Gh0st') for network detection, as advanced actors rewrite headers.
2. Avoid attempting ad-hoc file removal while endpoints remain networked, which can trigger automated persistence reinstatement.

References & External Analysis

• MITRE ATT&CK - Gh0st RAT (Software S0032)
• CISA Advisory AA20-258A - Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Abusing Gh0st
• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Backdoor:Win32/Gh0st
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-11882
• CISA Advisory: AA20-258A
• Search "gh0st" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "gh0st" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "gh0st" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: AA20-258A ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Mokes
• Asyncrat
• Netbus
• Bandook
• Wabot
• Njrat
• Turkojan
• Remcos

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/gh0st.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.