Wswhacker

Overview

Executive Summary

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

• Browser and Client Hooking: The malware immediately targets the local storage databases (SQLite files) and registry keys associated with popular software. It extracts saved plaintext passwords and auto-fill data from Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Outlook, and FileZilla.
• SAM Database Extraction: Advanced variants may attempt to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM) database or utilize techniques like Mimikatz (LSASS memory dumping) to extract Windows NTLM hashes for offline cracking or pass-the-hash attacks.
• Automated Exfiltration: Because Info-stealers do not necessarily need to maintain long-term persistence, Wswhacker quickly bundles the stolen data into a `.txt` or `.zip` file and transmits it to the attacker, often utilizing simple SMTP (email) or FTP protocols.

Threat Assessment

Incident Response and Remediation

• Immediate Network Isolation: Isolate the machine to halt any ongoing data exfiltration and prevent the attacker from utilizing the stolen credentials to pivot to other servers on the LAN.
• Universal Credential Reset: Assume all passwords saved in the user's browser, local email clients, and the local Windows Administrator account are fully compromised. A comprehensive password reset must be initiated immediately.
• Endpoint Eradication and Investigation: Utilize enterprise EDR to locate and terminate the Wswhacker process. Crucially, the incident response team must investigate *how* the Wswhacker tool was placed on the system, as its presence often implies a deeper, pre-existing compromise (like a backdoor or vulnerable public-facing service).

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• HackTool.Wswhacker
• Trojan.PWS.Wswhacker
• Win32/Wswhacker

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1003: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_WSWHACKER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Wswhacker"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "wswhacker" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hacktool.wswhacker" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan.pws.wswhacker" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/wswhacker" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Wswhacker (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: c63391b9-6be7-5082-be0e-68e78e66808f
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Wswhacker malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/wswhacker
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1552_001
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1048
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_WSWHACKER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Wswhacker tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "wswhacker" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Sever network connectivity for the flagged endpoint to terminate persistent command-and-control (C2) communication channels and stop Wswhacker from retrieving secondary stage payloads.
2. Capture process memory triage to detect and terminate malicious threads injected by Wswhacker into legitimate system processes such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe.
3. Audit Windows Registry Run keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) and Task Scheduler entries to locate and purge Wswhacker persistence hooks.
4. Deploy updated enterprise EDR detection signatures and conduct an out-of-band endpoint scan to isolate dropped binaries and staged payloads.
5. Rotate all credentials, domain user passwords, and session cookies active on the system during the Wswhacker execution timeframe.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Wswhacker dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Wswhacker until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "wswhacker" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "wswhacker" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "wswhacker" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Infector_Ng_2004
• Nivdort
• Sphinx
• Rvrat
• Hideproc
• Sathurbot
• Candyopen
• Browseban

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/wswhacker.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.