Poison

Overview

Poison Ivy (widely known across threat intelligence teams as PIVY) is one of the most historically significant and enduring Remote Access Trojans (RATs) in cyber warfare history, originally created in 2005 by Chinese software developer Song Shenghua (operating under the handle 'Shapeless'). Built in Delphi with a compact client payload (often under 10 KB in shellcode stub form), Poison Ivy offered comprehensive remote execution, process injection, audio surveillance, screen capture, file exfiltration, and password dumping. Between 2008 and 2014, Poison Ivy became the primary cyber espionage workhorse for numerous Chinese military and intelligence units, most famously People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department Third Department Unit 61398 (APT1), as well as APT2, APT3, APT10, and APT17. The malware gained worldwide notoriety when it was deployed as the post-exploitation payload in the historic 2011 RSA SecurID breach, as well as the compromise of dozens of Fortune 500 chemical, defense, and aerospace corporations in Operation Nitro. The tool employs a distinctive password handshake and custom binary protocol protected by Camellia or 256-bit AES encryption.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Poison Ivy
• PoisonIvy
• PIVY
• Trojan.PoisonIvy
• Win32/PoisonIvy
• Backdoor.PoisonIvy

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Song Shenghua ('Shapeless') / Chinese Military & Intelligence Units (PLA Unit 61398 / APT1) High confidence
  Basis: Authored by Chinese developer 'Shapeless' in 2005. Extensively documented by Mandiant, CISA, and the FBI as the central tactical RAT weaponized by PLA Unit 61398 (APT1) during intrusions against over 141 international enterprises. [source]

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Poison Ivy V2.0.0 · Poison Ivy V2.1.4 · Poison Ivy V2.3.2 (Flagship) · Poison Ivy 2014 Custom Apt Fork

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2010-3333 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2014-1761 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 4f23b7e64177d70425a176840d5885cfa169f4ea54753ba01908d095be9eb27d
• 9e49c7161bcf76ee8a20da62fecbf9bb748a31a98059bf4ce126ecba95f002f1

Delivery vectors

• Targeted spear-phishing emails containing weaponized RTF or Microsoft Word attachments exploiting CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333
• Strategic web compromise (watering hole attacks) delivering shellcode via Internet Explorer vulnerabilities

Persistence mechanisms

• Process injection and API hooking into explorer.exe, svchost.exe, or default browser binaries
• Service creation or HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry persistence

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_POISON_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Poison"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "poison" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "poison ivy" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "poisonivy" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pivy" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan.poisonivy" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/poisonivy" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "backdoor.poisonivy" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Poison (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: aa56c219-1756-59f0-97f4-4cea51f4d583
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Poison malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
  Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/poison
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_POISON_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Poison tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "poison" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately sever the endpoint from the network to terminate the attacker's interactive, remote-control session.
2. Capture a full RAM image of the endpoint; memory forensics is critical for extracting the PoisonIvy configuration and C2 details.
3. Identify the specific C2 IP address and implement immediate blocks at the perimeter firewall and proxy servers.
4. Assume total endpoint compromise; perform a clean OS rebuild and force password resets for all accounts that accessed the machine.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not leave the machine connected to the network during triage; the attacker has live access and will likely destroy evidence or deploy ransomware.
2. Do not assume the infection is isolated; PoisonIvy is frequently used as a beachhead for lateral movement across the domain.

References & External Analysis

• Mandiant - APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units
• MITRE ATT&CK - PoisonIvy (S0012)
• CISA Advisory - Securing Against Legacy Targeted Espionage Tools
• Search "poison" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "poison" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "poison" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Beast
• Prorat
• Houndhack
• Plugx
• Farfli
• Bifrost
• Ircbot
• Hupigon

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/poison.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.