Netwire

Overview

NetWire (cataloged across threat research as NetWire RAT, NetWire.RC, Backdoor:Win32/Netwire, and Trojan.Netwire) is a cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT) developed in C/C++ that was commercialized under the guise of legitimate remote administration by World Wired Labs (operated by Peter Salinger) from 2012 until its global law enforcement takedown by the FBI, Eurojust, and Australian Federal Police in March 2023. Unlike many contemporary RATs built on managed runtimes like .NET, NetWire was authored natively in C/C++, allowing it to execute with high performance, minimal memory footprints, and low detection footprints across Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms. Primarily distributed through targeted spear-phishing campaigns featuring malicious Microsoft Office documents exploiting legacy formula editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882) or archived ISO/LNK attachments, NetWire grants operators comprehensive command-and-control capabilities over compromised workstations. Its functionality includes low-level kernel keystroke logging via SetWindowsHookEx, spooling keystrokes into encrypted disk buffers, and mass credential harvesting targeting web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave), email clients (Microsoft Outlook, Thunderbird), FTP clients (FileZilla, WinSCP), and cryptocurrency desktop wallets. The implant establishes reverse TCP/TLS sessions to operator listeners, incorporating socks4/5 reverse proxy tunneling, live desktop screen streaming via custom VNC implementations, webcam and microphone capture, and remote file management. NetWire was heavily co-opted by state-sponsored cyber espionage groups and Business Email Compromise (BEC) threat syndicates targeting financial services, manufacturing, healthcare, and maritime supply chains. In August 2020, CISA issued Advisory AA20-258A highlighting NetWire's role in commercial phishing infrastructure.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• RAT.NetWire
• Backdoor.NetWire
• Win32/NetWire
• NetWire.RC
• Trojan:Win32/Netwire
• World Wired Labs NetWire

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: World_Wired_Labs

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Netwire_Rc · Netwire_V3 · Netwire_Crossplatform

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1056.001 · T1555.003 · T1071.001 · T1055.012 · T1547.001 · T1105 · T1113 · T1125 · T1090.001

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.
• T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.
• T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 88a107ef4ef3b34208a0df70216b3f7f8d689626bc6594c9f187a27eb2a29c15
• 6880df8cfb2b73ecf5cefa1d2df0f6ba2360b64bebf80c8502f232599c279c65
• 3e62f02cb8594d6e902b115ee877990155b46e38a202722b51ee2bc3a4ea8474

Delivery vectors

• Spear-phishing emails disguised as shipping notices, purchase orders, or wire remittances
• Weaponized Office documents exploiting Equation Editor CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-0199
• Archived ISO, IMG, or ZIP attachments containing obfuscated VBScript or LNK shortcut droppers

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Netwire
• Startup folder shortcut placement: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
• Hidden executable dropping into %APPDATA%\Logs or %APPDATA%\Install with randomized naming

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_NETWIRE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Netwire"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "rat.netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "backdoor.netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "netwire.rc" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "trojan:win32/netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "world wired labs netwire" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Netwire (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 613a1b4e-31fa-5652-9b5b-f4cd473710d5
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Netwire malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
  Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/netwire
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1055_012
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_NETWIRE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Netwire tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

References & External Analysis

• U.S. Department of Justice: NetWire RAT Infrastructure Seizure
• CISA Alert AA20-258A: Guidance on NetWire and Phishing Threats
• Eurojust: International Operation Takedown of NetWire Malware
• Mandiant: NetWire RAT Weaponized in BEC and Phishing Campaigns
• CISA Advisory: AA20-258A
• Search "netwire" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "netwire" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "netwire" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: AA20-258A ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Xtrat
• Hupigon
• Immirat
• Cosmu
• Mokes
• Nuclear_Rat
• Wabot
• Serenity_Rat

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/netwire.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.