Coinloader

Overview

Executive Summary

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

• Miner Deployment: The downloader reaches out to attacker-controlled infrastructure (often utilizing paste sites like Pastebin or compromised GitHub repositories) to download an open-source or custom-built mining application (e.g., XMRig).
• Stealth and Evasion: To prevent the user from noticing the massive spike in CPU usage, the loader often injects the miner into a legitimate Windows process (`svchost.exe`, `notepad.exe`). Advanced variants will actively monitor the Task Manager; if the user opens the Task Manager, the miner temporarily suspends its activity to hide the CPU spike.
• Defense Evasion: Coinloader frequently utilizes PowerShell scripts to modify Windows Defender settings, adding exclusions for its own directories to prevent the miner from being quarantined.

Threat Assessment

Incident Response and Remediation

• Network Isolation and Process Termination: Identify the process consuming massive CPU resources (often a legitimate-sounding process name running from an unusual directory like `%AppData%`). Terminate the process and isolate the machine to halt mining and prevent re-infection.
• Hunting for Persistence: Coinloader relies heavily on Scheduled Tasks and WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) event subscriptions for persistence. Thoroughly audit these areas using PowerShell or EDR tools.
• Review AV Exclusions: Carefully review the local Antivirus/Windows Defender settings. The malware likely added folder or process exclusions that must be manually removed before a clean scan can be performed.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan.Downloader.CoinMiner
• Riskware.Coinloader
• CoinMiner

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_COINLOADER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Coinloader"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "coinloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan.downloader.coinminer" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "riskware.coinloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "coinminer" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Coinloader (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: fa720531-beb1-5025-b46f-19e6279091e1
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Coinloader malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/coinloader
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1496
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1055
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_COINLOADER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Coinloader tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "coinloader" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate affected host(s) from the internal network (disconnect physical Ethernet and disable Wi-Fi/Bluetooth) to prevent Coinloader from spreading laterally or encrypting network-attached storage (NAS) and shared SMB volumes.
2. Preserve volatile system memory (RAM capture) on a representative endpoint before attempting a reboot or power-down, as Coinloader symmetric encryption keys or uncompiled payload components may still reside in memory.
3. Audit process execution logs and terminate active scripting interpreters (e.g. PowerShell, CMD, WScript) or commands executing 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows' or 'wbadmin' used by Coinloader to inhibit recovery.
4. Investigate the initial compromise vector (such as exposed RDP instances, spearphishing attachments, or vulnerable edge gateways) and enforce an immediate credential reset for all compromised Active Directory accounts.
5. Restore critical assets and databases exclusively from verified, air-gapped, or immutable offline backups once the Coinloader binary and related persistence hooks are eradicated.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not restart or power cycle infected systems prematurely; doing so destroys volatile RAM encryption keys and may trigger bootloader locking logic embedded in Coinloader.
2. Avoid negotiating or paying the extortion demand without prior forensic evaluation and consultation with incident response specialists, as payment does not guarantee data recovery.
3. Do not connect clean backup drives or external storage to the affected network until Coinloader eradication is completely verified.

References & External Analysis

• Search "coinloader" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "coinloader" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "coinloader" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Delikle
• Bits
• Rasftuby
• Kate
• Powerun
• Birele
• Emathi
• Sdld

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/coinloader.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.