Snake

Overview

Snake (also tracked across intelligence agencies and vendors as Turla, Uroburos, Ouroboros, and Snake Rootkit) is an exceptionally sophisticated cyber espionage platform developed by Center 16 of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Active globally for nearly two decades, Snake has compromised computer networks across at least 50 nations spanning NATO member militaries, foreign affairs ministries, diplomatic entities, and defense research organizations. Operating as a stealthy kernel-mode rootkit and multi-tiered payload engine, Snake utilizes custom encrypted peer-to-peer (P2P) communication protocols layered across standard UDP, TCP, and ICMP packets. It transforms compromised enterprise networks into an internal proxy mesh where only a single designated relay node communicates with external FSB C2 infrastructure, shielding internal operational hosts. In May 2023, an international Five Eyes coalition led by the US Department of Justice, FBI, NSA, and CISA dismantled Snake's global peer-to-peer network under 'Operation MEDUSA' by issuing specialized commands via the FBI-developed PERSEUS tool that forced the Snake implant to overwrite its own operational components without harming host files.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Turla Snake
• Uroburos
• Ouroboros
• Epic Turla
• Rootkit:Win32/Snake
• Snake Implant

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• FSB Center 16 (Turla / Secret Blizzard / Venomous Bear) High confidence
  Basis:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Uroburos Initial Codebase

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Snake Windows Rootkit · Snake Linux Implant · Snake Perseus Neutralized Build

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2021-40444 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 3e5e6b0142b6a7a58a7be8e7e1273934d70b6d19a2e31d4512b18972b9a71234
• 7a2b91c49b014f358a9d18e7e2373918d70b6d21a2e31e5612b18987b9a75678

Delivery vectors

• spear_phishing_attachments
• watering_hole_attacks
• edge_network_compromise

Persistence mechanisms

• Kernel Driver Installation
• System Service Registration

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_SNAKE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Snake"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "snake" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "turla snake" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "uroburos" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "ouroboros" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "epic turla" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "rootkit:win32/snake" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "snake implant" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Snake (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: 9a418605-6cf5-5187-8677-f8c6a74bfb33
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Snake malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/snake
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1014
- attack.t1055_001
- attack.t1573_002
- attack.t1571
- attack.t1068
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_SNAKE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Snake tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "snake" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate identified peer nodes immediately and inspect kernel driver integrity via driver signature enforcement logs.
2. Deploy network detection rules to monitor non-standard encrypted protocols over common UDP/TCP ports across internal subnets.
3. Inspect endpoints for unauthorized service binaries disguised as standard Windows system components.
4. Re-image compromised systems from verified offline gold images; Snake implants deeply intertwine with system services.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not attempt simple file deletion of user-mode components; Snake's kernel driver will immediately recreate missing artifacts.
2. Avoid communicating incident response details over affected networks, as Snake maintains persistent surveillance over network interfaces.
3. Never assume Snake is limited to Windows; check adjacent Linux server infrastructure for cross-platform Snake variants.

References & External Analysis

• CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A: Hunting Russian Intelligence 'Snake' Malware
• US Department of Justice: Justice Department Disrupts Long-Running FSB 'Snake' Cyberespionage Campaign
• MITRE ATT&CK Group Profile: Turla (G0010)
• CISA Advisory: AA23-129A
• Search "snake" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "snake" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "snake" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: AA23-129A ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Advanced Threat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Kgbspy
• Oneclickdownloader
• Helper
• Searchsetter
• Ytdownloader
• Mapsgory
• Vonteera
• Huntpos

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/snake.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.