Revil
Table of Contents
Overview
REvil (also universally known as Sodinokibi and Sodin) was one of the most prolific and technically sophisticated Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) cartels in cybercrime history, operating from April 2019 until its dismantling in late 2021. Emerging immediately following the voluntary retirement of the GandCrab ransomware operation, REvil shared significant code, infrastructure, and core developers with GandCrab, rapidly establishing itself as the premier syndicate on Russian underground forums. Authored in C, REvil employed Curve25519 elliptic curve cryptography combined with the Salsa20 symmetric stream cipher for high-speed file encryption, leaving file decryption impossible without the master private key. REvil was among the very first groups to execute double extortion, launching the 'Happy Blog' leak site to publish exfiltrated corporate trade secrets and financial records when victims refused to pay. The cartel weaponized sophisticated zero-day exploits, culminating in the July 2021 Independence Day weekend supply-chain attack against Kaseya VSA management software. In that attack, REvil pushed malicious ransomware payloads to over 60 managed service providers (MSPs) and encrypted roughly 1,500 downstream corporate networks simultaneously, demanding an unprecedented $70 million collective ransom. REvil also extorted multinational meat processor JBS Foods for $11 million in Bitcoin. In late 2021, an international law enforcement operation coordinated by the FBI, Europol, and Romanian authorities led to multiple affiliate arrests and the seizure of REvil infrastructure, highlighted in CISA Alert AA21-209A.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Gandcrab
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Sodinokibi_V1 · Sodinokibi_V2 · Revil_Kaseya
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1486 · T1490 · T1190 · T1059.001 · T1021.002 · T1003.001 · T1041
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1003.001: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.
- T1059.001: Restrict execution of PowerShell. Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and Script Block Logging.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-LSA | LSA Protection & Credential Guard | Harden | T1003.001 | Enable Windows LSA RunAsPPL (Protected Process Light) and Credential Guard to prevent memory dumping of lsass.exe. |
D3-NBA | Network Behavioral Analysis | Detect | T1021.002 | Enforce SMB message signing, disable legacy SMBv1, and restrict administrative share access (C$, ADMIN$) to dedicated PAM bastion hosts. |
D3-EAF | Egress Analysis and Filtering | Isolate | T1041 | Enforce perimeter TLS inspection and alert on anomalous outbound data volume ratios transmitting over active C2 channels. |
D3-PSBL | PowerShell Script Block Logging | Detect | T1059.001 | Enable PowerShell event ID 4104 and Constrained Language Mode to neuter obfuscated script payloads. |
D3-FAED | File Alteration Early Detection | Detect | T1486 | Deploy canary files and monitor mass rename/encryption I/O spikes to terminate ransomware threads immediately. |
D3-VSS | Volume Shadow & Snapshot Hardening | Harden | T1490 | Block execution of vssadmin.exe and wmic shadowcopy delete; maintain air-gapped immutable backup repositories. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2019-19781 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2021-34527 — Vulnerability documentation and metrics (NIST NVD ↗).
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
d8a571025b508f72a4209bf270b8a098b671a52028ddc87c14a22ad31737be70c87c14a22ad31737be70d8a571025b508f72a4209bf270b8a098b671a52028dd70b8a098b671a52028ddc87c14a22ad31737be70d8a571025b508f72a4209bf2
Delivery vectors
Supply chain exploitation of remote management software (e.g. Kaseya VSA zero-days)Exploitation of Citrix ADC gateway vulnerability CVE-2019-19781 and VPN appliancesStaged execution via Qakbot, IcedID, and Cobalt Strike initial access loaders
Persistence mechanisms
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run entry pointing to dropped ransomware binarySafe Mode execution persistence configured via BCDEDIT /set {current} safeboot minimalScheduled task creation configured to execute with SYSTEM level privileges
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_REVIL_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Revil"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "revil" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "sodinokibi" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "sodin" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "revil ransomware" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "trojan.ransom.sodinokibi" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "win32/sodinokibi" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Revil (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: 97bc2737-8d9c-5840-a64f-02e04a482fd6
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Revil malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/revil
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1059_001
- attack.t1021_002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \vssadmin.exe
- \wmic.exe
- \wbadmin.exe
- \bcdedit.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- delete shadows
- shadowcopy delete
- resize shadowstorage
- recoveryenabled no
- ignoreallfailures
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_REVIL_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Revil tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "revil" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
References & External Analysis
- CISA Alert AA21-209A: Top Routinely Exploited Malware - REvil / Sodinokibi
- FBI Flash Alert: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Sodinokibi / REvil
- Mandiant Threat Research: Sodinokibi Ransomware Exploits and Affiliates
- Secureworks Counter Threat Unit: REvil / Sodinokibi Threat Profile
- CISA Advisory: AA21-209A
- Search "revil" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "revil" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "revil" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: AA21-209A ↗
Frequently Asked Questions
What is REvil (Sodinokibi) and how did it originate?
REvil (Sodinokibi) was a premier Russian-speaking Ransomware-as-a-Service cartel that emerged in April 2019 as the direct operational successor to the GandCrab ransomware family.
What was the Kaseya VSA supply chain attack?
In July 2021, REvil exploited zero-day authentication bypass flaws in Kaseya VSA server software to deploy ransomware to over 1,500 businesses through their managed service providers (MSPs).
What cryptographic scheme did REvil employ?
REvil combined Curve25519 elliptic curve cryptography with the Salsa20 stream cipher, generating unique per-file keys that were securely encrypted using the master public key.
What was the 'Happy Blog'?
The Happy Blog was REvil's dark web leak portal where the gang auctioned and leaked sensitive stolen corporate files of victim companies that refused to negotiate ransom demands.
How was REvil dismantled?
In late 2021, a multinational law enforcement operation led by the FBI, Europol, and international partners seized REvil servers, obtained master decryption keys, and arrested key affiliates.
How did REvil exploit CVE-2021-30116 in the Kaseya VSA supply chain attack?
On July 2, 2021, REvil executed a devastating supply chain attack by exploiting an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-30116) in on-premises Kaseya VSA remote management servers. REvil leveraged Kaseya's administrative distribution channels to push malicious fake updates containing the REvil encryptor (agent.exe) to downstream managed service provider (MSP) clients, simultaneously compromising over 1,500 businesses worldwide.
What asymmetric cryptography algorithms did REvil employ to ensure uncrackable file encryption?
REvil employed an elliptic-curve cryptography architecture utilizing Curve25519 for asymmetric key exchange and Salsa20 for symmetric file stream encryption. A master public key embedded within the ransomware binary ensured that only the syndicate operators held the root private key, while a second session key pair was generated per victim host, preventing localized decryption without operator authorization.
How did the REvil affiliate model and automated Tor auction portal operate before the 2022 FSB crackdown?
REvil operated a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform where vetted affiliates conducted network breaches and received 70–80% of ransom proceeds, while the core developers retained 20–30%. REvil operated 'Happy Blog' on the Tor network, featuring an automated auction system where stolen victim data was publicly auctioned to the highest bidder if extortion demands were not met.
How do I remove the Revil Ransomware from Windows?
Manual removal of Revil is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Revil a virus or a Ransomware?
Revil is classified as a Ransomware. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Revil typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Revil infection?
Symptoms of Revil can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Ransomwares
Want to prevent Revil and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Ransomware Containment & Incident Response.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/revil.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.