Kasidet
Table of Contents
Overview
Kasidet (cataloged across threat research as Neutrino Bot, Win32/Kasidet, Trojan.Kasidet, and Backdoor:Win32/Kasidet) is a sophisticated modular Windows botnet agent, backdoor, and Point-of-Sale (POS) memory scraper that emerged in late 2013. Designed for multi-purpose cybercriminal campaigns, Kasidet incorporates aggressive anti-analysis and anti-virtual machine evasion routines to defeat sandbox analysis before establishing persistent command-and-control connectivity. Its specialized memory-scraping module searches running process memory for Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe payment card structures using regular expressions. In addition to payment card theft, Kasidet provides attackers with keylogging, browser form grabbing, remote shell execution, DDoS flood attacks (HTTP, UDP, SYN), and secondary payload staging. Threat actors frequently distribute Kasidet via spear-phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office attachments that exploit memory corruption and equation editor vulnerabilities.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Neutrino Botnet Engine
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Kasidet V3.2 · Kasidet V3.9 · Neutrinopos
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1056.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | Credential Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1005 | Data from Local System | Collection | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1498 | Network Denial of Service | Impact | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1055.002 | Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection | Defense Evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-FDM | File Data Monitoring | Detect | T1005 | Deploy Data Loss Prevention (DLP) agents to audit sensitive file access and block unauthorized batch file copying. |
D3-PIAD | Process Injection Analysis & Detection | Detect | T1055.002 | Monitor cross-process thread creation (CreateRemoteThread) and asynchronous procedure calls (QueueUserAPC). |
D3-MFA | Multi-factor Authentication | Harden | T1056.001 | Enforce FIDO2 / WebAuthn physical tokens to render keystroke-intercepted passwords useless. |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-TR | Traffic Rate Limiting | Isolate | T1498 | Deploy BGP Flowspec and edge scrubbing proxies to automatically throttle volumetric SYN and UDP reflection attacks. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d
Delivery vectors
Spear-phishing emails delivering malicious RTF and Word documents exploiting CVE-2017-11882Drive-by compromise via malicious web links distributing Neutrino loader stubs
Persistence mechanisms
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\KasidetBotScheduled task configured via schtasks to relaunch the loader from %APPDATA%\Kasidet
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_KASIDET_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Kasidet"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "kasidet" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "neutrino bot" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "win32/kasidet" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "trojan.kasidet" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "backdoor:win32/kasidet" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "neutrinopos" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Kasidet (Pos Malware) Execution & Triage
id: 2f4177ec-5fe5-5da7-8261-0c83088f8bef
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Kasidet malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/kasidet
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.pos-malware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1498
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \wscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- AppData\Local\Temp
- -WindowStyle Hidden
- /e:jscript
- bitsadmin /transfer
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_KASIDET_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Kasidet tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "kasidet" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Isolate POS terminals and infected endpoints from internal cardholder data networks immediately.
- Terminate active Kasidet bot processes and injected host processes.
- Remove persistence keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
- Report potential payment card data exposure to card brand merchant risk programs and payment processors.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not allow direct internet browsing or unmonitored outbound HTTP/HTTPS from dedicated POS checkout systems.
- Avoid running Point-of-Sale systems without strict process allowlisting and network segmentation.
References & External Analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Kasidet malware family?
Kasidet (Neutrino Bot) is a versatile Windows botnet agent featuring POS RAM scraping, keylogging, and DDoS capabilities.
How does Kasidet harvest payment card data from POS terminals?
It scans the process memory of retail and checkout applications, extracting Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data using regex patterns.
What anti-analysis defenses does Kasidet implement?
It checks for virtual machine artifacts, debuggers, sandboxes, and security hooks before executing malicious routines.
Which CVE vulnerabilities have been linked to Kasidet delivery?
Kasidet droppers frequently weaponize Microsoft Office vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2012-0158.
How can organizations protect POS endpoints from Kasidet?
Isolate POS environments on dedicated network segments, enable application allowlisting, and deploy endpoint process monitoring.
How do I remove the Kasidet Pos_Malware from Windows?
Manual removal of Kasidet is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Kasidet a virus or a Pos_Malware?
Kasidet is classified as a Pos_Malware. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Kasidet typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Kasidet infection?
Symptoms of Kasidet can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Pos_Malwares
Want to prevent Kasidet and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Think You've Been Hacked? What To Do First.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/kasidet.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.