Wdfload

Overview

Wdfload (cataloged across security software as Trojan:Win32/Wdfload, Rootkit:Win32/Wdfload, and Trojan.Wdfload) is an advanced Windows rootkit and kernel-mode staging loader that abuses legitimate Windows Driver Framework (WDF) components to achieve stealthy kernel execution. By dropping and registering rogue kernel-mode drivers under %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\drivers\, Wdfload hooks storage and filesystem callbacks to conceal malicious user-mode processes, prevent file deletion, and inject backdoors directly into system host processes while evading user-mode antimalware detection. Once embedded, Wdfload functions as a persistent covert conduit for secondary cyber espionage and data destruction payloads.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Wdfload
• Rootkit:Win32/Wdfload
• Trojan.Wdfload
• Win32/Wdfload.Rootkit
• Kernel.Wdfload

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Kernel Rootkit Frameworks

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Wdfload.V1 · Wdfload.V2 · Win32/Wdfload.Gen

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2015-1641 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b
• 5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d

Delivery vectors

• Targeted spear-phishing campaigns with weaponized Office attachments exploiting CVE-2017-0199
• Exploitation of unpatched public-facing web servers to drop privilege escalation loaders

Persistence mechanisms

• Kernel-mode service registered under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wdfload
• Rogue driver placement in %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\drivers\wdfload.sys

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_WDFLOAD_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Wdfload"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "wdfload" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/wdfload" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "rootkit:win32/wdfload" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.wdfload" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/wdfload.rootkit" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "kernel.wdfload" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Wdfload (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: bc3b54b6-d46f-579a-bfc6-eec3392feb82
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Wdfload malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/wdfload
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1543_003
- attack.t1014
- attack.t1055_012
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_WDFLOAD_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Wdfload tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "wdfload" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate the affected host immediately and boot into an offline WinPE recovery environment to inspect kernel drivers.
2. Delete the rogue driver binary located in %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\drivers\wdfload.sys.
3. Purge the driver service registry entry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wdfload.
4. Enable Memory Integrity (HVCI) and Driver Signature Enforcement to block unsigned or revoked kernel drivers.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not attempt live rootkit removal while the operating system is booted in standard mode, as driver hooks protect files.
2. Avoid disabling Driver Signature Enforcement (test-signing mode) on production Windows workstations.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/Wdfload
• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - Rootkit.Win32.Wdfload
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-0199
• Search "wdfload" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "wdfload" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "wdfload" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Advanced Threat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Widgi
• Singleclickreg
• Equationdrug
• Webdiscover
• Deepsea
• Shopperz
• Syncopate
• Vbkeylog

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/wdfload.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.