Daws

Overview

TrojanDownloader:Win32/Daws (cataloged across security vendors as Trojan.Daws or Ransom.Daws) is a persistent Windows trojan downloader and stage-one ransomware delivery mechanism engineered to breach endpoint perimeters and orchestrate the automated deployment of secondary extortion payloads. Operating through heavily packed executables dropped into temporary system directories (%Temp%), Daws establishes scheduled tasks and modifies registry Run keys to ensure persistence. Once a machine profile is established, Daws initiates encrypted HTTPS beacons to remote C2 infrastructure, pulling down secondary ransomware binaries that systematically traverse local and mapped network drives, encrypt target document and database extensions, delete Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin, and display ransom notes demanding cryptocurrency payments.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Daws
• TrojanDownloader:Win32/Daws
• Trojan.Daws
• Win32/Daws
• Daws Downloader
• Ransom.Daws
• Trojan:Win32/Daws

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Cybercrime Ransomware Affiliates High confidence
  Basis:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Daws.A Downloader · Daws Ransomware Stage · Daws Scheduled Task Variant

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 2e3f4a5b6c708192a3b4c5d6e7f8091a2b3c4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f81122
• 9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a22

Delivery vectors

• malspam_weaponized_archives
• exploit_kit_landing_pages

Persistence mechanisms

• Windows Task Scheduler Job Creation
• HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_DAWS_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Daws"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "daws" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "daws" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojandownloader:win32/daws" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.daws" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/daws" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "daws downloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "ransom.daws" ascii wide nocase
        $s8 = "trojan:win32/daws" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Daws (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: a8fd07ee-2644-5316-b236-feb515c96579
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Daws malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status tampering,
  and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/daws
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1053_005
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_DAWS_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Daws tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "daws" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately disconnect infected machines from internal networks to stop active ransomware spreading across shared drives.
2. Audit Windows Task Scheduler and delete unauthorized tasks executing binaries from %Temp% or AppData folders.
3. Verify the integrity of immutable offline backups before attempting system restoration.
4. Deploy security updates patching Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not pay ransom demands, as payment finances criminal operations and offers no guarantee of decryption.
2. Avoid allowing endpoints to execute scripts or unsigned binaries directly out of %Temp% directories.
3. Never neglect monitoring unauthorized vssadmin executions targeting Volume Shadow Copies.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Security Intelligence: TrojanDownloader:Win32/Daws Technical Guidance
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia: Trojan.Daws Analysis
• NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2017-11882
• Search "daws" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "daws" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "daws" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Genericrxdw
• Genericrxfq
• Droma
• Pitin
• Stegvob
• Fosniw
• Platan
• Zesibund

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/daws.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.