Mintluks

Overview

Mintluks (tracked across security telemetry as PWS:MSIL/Mintluks, TrojanDownloader:Win32/Mintluks, and MSIL/Mintluks) is a specialized .NET-based information stealer and malware downloader discovered in circulation around 2014. Built using Microsoft Intermediate Language (.NET framework), Mintluks is engineered to harvest authentication credentials, session cookies, and sensitive system telemetry from infected Windows machines. The malware systematically inspects local profiles of major web browsers (including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, and Microsoft Edge), file transfer clients (FileZilla, WinSCP), and email applications to extract plaintext and encrypted account passwords. Mintluks also features integrated downloader capabilities, allowing operators to deploy secondary trojans, keyloggers, or cryptocurrency mining payloads. To evade static analysis, Mintluks employ code obfuscation (such as ConfuserEx or custom string encryption) and establishes persistence using Windows registry autostart run keys and scheduled background tasks.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• PWS:MSIL/Mintluks
• TrojanDownloader:Win32/Mintluks
• PWS:MSIL/Mintluks.A
• PWS:MSIL/Mintluks.B
• MSIL/Mintluks

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Msil Credential Stealer Frameworks

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Mintluks.A · Mintluks.B · Mintluks.Downloader

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c
• 5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d

Delivery vectors

• Phishing emails with compressed ZIP archives containing compiled .NET loader executables
• Malicious torrent downloads and trojanized key generators

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MintluksStealer
• Scheduled Task: Microsoft\Windows\NetFramework\MintluksSync

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_MINTLUKS_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Mintluks"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "mintluks" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "pws:msil/mintluks" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojandownloader:win32/mintluks" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pws:msil/mintluks.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "pws:msil/mintluks.b" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "msil/mintluks" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Mintluks (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: 6190d51c-c7d4-5cc1-a0e5-3592e712b5d6
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Mintluks malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting,
  master key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/mintluks
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_MINTLUKS_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Mintluks tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "mintluks" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disconnect the affected host from corporate networks to prevent ongoing credential exfiltration.
2. Identify and terminate active .NET executable instances running from %APPDATA% or user temp folders.
3. Delete scheduled tasks and registry run keys created by Mintluks.
4. Initiate comprehensive credential rotations for all corporate accounts, email logins, and cloud dashboards accessed from the host.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow users to save corporate or administrative passwords in unencrypted browser storage.
2. Avoid downloading untrusted .NET utilities or game mods from third-party community hosting platforms.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - PWS:MSIL/Mintluks
• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - TrojanDownloader:Win32/Mintluks
• Search "mintluks" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "mintluks" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "mintluks" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Infostealer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Razy
• Fareit
• Azorult
• Ardamax
• Qqpass
• Papras
• Lumma
• Hploki

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/mintluks.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.