Bsymem
Table of Contents
Overview
Trojan:Win32/Bsymem (cataloged across vendor telemetry as Trojan.Bsymem or Ransom.Bsymem) is a stealthy dual-stage remote access backdoor and enterprise ransomware staging vehicle designed to establish persistent covert access within corporate environments. Delivered via targeted spear-phishing attachments or dropped through exploit kits, Bsymem utilizes multi-layer code packing and process injection into legitimate Windows services (such as svchost.exe) to conceal its outbound command-and-control communications. Once network persistence is secured via hidden scheduled tasks, Bsymem facilitates lateral network reconnaissance before executing a multi-threaded ransomware module that encrypts local and mapped network shares, terminates critical system services, and leaves ransom notes demanding cryptocurrency payments.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Threat Actor Attribution
Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.
- Cybercrime Extortion Groups High confidence
Basis:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Bsymem.A · Bsymem Svchost Injector · Bsymem Ransomware Payload Build
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | impact | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1055 | Process Injection | defense-evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | defense-evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1071.001 | Web Protocols | command-and-control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | impact | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-BDA | Binary De-obfuscation & Unpacking | Analyze | T1027 | Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation. |
D3-STM | Scheduled Task Creation Analysis | Detect | T1053.005 | Audit task creation targeting system and hidden service directories; verify task author credentials. |
D3-PIAD | Process Injection Analysis & Detection | Detect | T1055 | Monitor cross-process thread creation (CreateRemoteThread) and asynchronous procedure calls (QueueUserAPC). |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-FAED | File Alteration Early Detection | Detect | T1486 | Deploy canary files and monitor mass rename/encryption I/O spikes to terminate ransomware threads immediately. |
D3-VSS | Volume Shadow & Snapshot Hardening | Harden | T1490 | Block execution of vssadmin.exe and wmic shadowcopy delete; maintain air-gapped immutable backup repositories. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2017-0144 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile
How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.
| Protocols | HTTPS, HTTP |
|---|---|
| Observed ports | 443, 80, 8080 |
| Identifiable from traffic alone | Medium |
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
5b6c708192a3b4c5d6e7f8091a2b3c4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f81122334455c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a2334455
Delivery vectors
spearphishing_attachmentsexploit_kit_payloads
Persistence mechanisms
Windows Scheduled Task Creationsvchost.exe process injection
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_BSYMEM_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Bsymem"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "bsymem" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "bsymem" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan:win32/bsymem" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "trojan.bsymem" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "win32/bsymem" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "ransom.bsymem" ascii wide nocase
$s7 = "trojan:win32/bsymem.a" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Bsymem (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: 25dc1486-2810-530f-be92-2497bd283964
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Bsymem malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/bsymem
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1053_005
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \vssadmin.exe
- \wmic.exe
- \wbadmin.exe
- \bcdedit.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- delete shadows
- shadowcopy delete
- resize shadowstorage
- recoveryenabled no
- ignoreallfailures
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_BSYMEM_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Bsymem tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "bsymem" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Immediately isolate infected endpoints from corporate subnets to halt active network share encryption.
- Capture volatile RAM dumps before system shutdown to preserve unencrypted ransomware keys.
- Audit scheduled tasks and remove unauthorized entries executing binaries from user AppData directories.
- Deploy security updates patching Microsoft Office CVE-2017-11882 and SMB vulnerability MS17-010.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not pay extortion ransom demands, as payment finances crime syndicates with no recovery guarantee.
- Avoid allowing uninspected process injections into standard Windows services like svchost.exe.
- Never leave unsegmented enterprise file shares accessible to all internal user subnets.
References & External Analysis
- Microsoft Security Intelligence: Trojan:Win32/Bsymem Threat Advisory
- Trend Micro Security Intelligence: Ransom.Bsymem Analysis
- NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2017-11882
- Search "bsymem" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "bsymem" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "bsymem" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Bsymem malware?
Bsymem is a stealthy dual-stage remote access backdoor and ransomware loader designed to compromise corporate networks and deploy extortion encryptors.
How does Bsymem evade endpoint detection?
Bsymem utilizes multi-layer packing and injects its core modules into svchost.exe to blend in with legitimate Windows service activity.
How does Bsymem achieve persistence?
Bsymem creates hidden Windows Scheduled Tasks and modifies the Windows Registry Run keys to execute upon system startup.
What impact does a Bsymem infection have on enterprise networks?
Bsymem enables remote adversary reconnaissance, steals network credentials, and deploys ransomware encrypting shared enterprise drives.
What vulnerabilities were associated with Bsymem attacks?
Bsymem campaigns weaponized Office document flaws including CVE-2017-11882 and interacted with network vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue).
How do I remove Bsymem from Windows?
Manual removal of Bsymem is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
What are the main symptoms of a Bsymem infection?
Symptoms of Bsymem can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Ransomwares
Want to prevent Bsymem and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Ransomware Containment & Incident Response.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/bsymem.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.