Redator
Table of Contents
Overview
Executive Summary
Redator is a sophisticated Information Stealer (InfoStealer) and Trojan designed to silently harvest sensitive credentials, session tokens, and financial data from compromised Windows endpoints. Often distributed via targeted spam campaigns, Redator acts as an automated data exfiltration tool, directly contributing to account takeovers and broader enterprise breaches.Infection Vector and Extraction Methodology
Redator is heavily distributed via mass malspam campaigns. The phishing emails frequently utilize socially engineered lures (e.g., fake invoices or shipping manifests) containing malicious attachments—such as weaponized Excel documents, ISO images, or obfuscated VBScript droppers. Upon execution, Redator performs rapid, automated data extraction:- Credential Theft: It systematically targets the internal databases of major web browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge), FTP clients, and email clients, extracting saved passwords, autofill data, and active session cookies.
- System Profiling: Redator gathers deep system telemetry, including hardware identifiers, installed software lists, and network configurations, which helps attackers profile the value of the compromised host.
- Data Exfiltration: The stolen intelligence is aggregated, compressed, and covertly transmitted to the attacker's command-and-control (C2) server via HTTP POST requests, effectively bypassing basic perimeter defenses.
Security and Privacy Implications
A Redator infection is a critical security breach resulting in the immediate compromise of both corporate and personal credentials. This stolen intelligence is frequently used by the attackers to pivot laterally into corporate networks (via VPN or RDP) or sold on dark web marketplaces.Incident Response and Mitigation
- Credential Invalidation: Immediate, organization-wide password resets are mandatory following a confirmed Redator infection. All active session tokens and VPN access keys must be forcibly revoked.
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR): Deploy EDR solutions configured to alert on processes attempting unauthorized, bulk access to browser profile directories and the `CryptUnprotectData` API.
- Email Security: Implement strict email filtering and sandboxing to block malicious attachments before they reach the end-user, disrupting the primary distribution vector.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | Unknown | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1003 | OS Credential Dumping (Built-in Mimikatz integration) | Credential Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (Exfiltration via SMTP/Email) | Exfiltration | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1003: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-LSA | LSASS Memory Protection | Harden | T1003 | Enable Windows Credential Guard (LsaCfgFlags) and restrict debug privileges (SeDebugPrivilege). |
D3-NDF | Network Data Filtering | Isolate | T1048.003 | Inspect non-standard port traffic and block unauthorized ICMP or DNS tunneling protocols at the network perimeter. |
D3-CVH | Credential Vault Hardening | Harden | T1555.003 | Enable DPAPI master key audit logging and isolate browser SQLite database files within virtualization-based security containers. |
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_REDATOR_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Redator"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "redator" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "trojan.redator" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "passwordstealer.redator" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "win32/redator" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Redator (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: c37cf247-d9c5-5ab7-a499-aa29ac05db04
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Redator malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/redator
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1048_003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \wscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- AppData\Local\Temp
- -WindowStyle Hidden
- /e:jscript
- bitsadmin /transfer
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: mediumTier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_REDATOR_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Redator tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "redator" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Sever network connectivity for the flagged endpoint to terminate persistent command-and-control (C2) communication channels and stop Redator from retrieving secondary stage payloads.
- Capture process memory triage to detect and terminate malicious threads injected by Redator into legitimate system processes such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe.
- Audit Windows Registry Run keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) and Task Scheduler entries to locate and purge Redator persistence hooks.
- Deploy updated enterprise EDR detection signatures and conduct an out-of-band endpoint scan to isolate dropped binaries and staged payloads.
- Rotate all credentials, domain user passwords, and session cookies active on the system during the Redator execution timeframe.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Redator dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
- Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Redator until memory triage is complete.
- Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.
References & External Analysis
- Search "redator" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "redator" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "redator" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Redator and what threat category does it belong to?
Redator is classified as a Trojan. Documented across security telemetry, it is engineered to execute unauthorized operations, establish persistent footholds on target endpoints, and facilitate malicious campaigns targeting enterprise and individual environments.
How does Redator establish persistence and evade defensive controls?
Redator typically establishes persistence through registry run keys, scheduled tasks, or service installations, while evading signature-based antivirus solutions through code obfuscation, memory injection, or anti-analysis sandbox checks.
What are the essential incident response steps for mitigating a Redator compromise?
Security teams responding to Redator should immediately isolate affected endpoints from the network, perform memory triage to capture volatile forensic artifacts, audit registry and startup persistence mechanisms, revoke exposed user credentials, and restore systems from verified, clean backups.
What secondary payloads and staging behaviors are commonly associated with Trojan.Redator?
Trojan.Redator frequently operates as a loader or dropper designed to establish a foothold before downloading and executing secondary high-impact malware payloads. Depending on the threat actor's objectives, these dropped modules can range from ransomware and banking injects to modular infostealers and remote management backdoors.
How can security operations teams effectively detect and hunt for Trojan.Redator across enterprise endpoints?
Defenders should hunt for Trojan.Redator by deploying behavioral endpoint detection and response (EDR) rules that monitor suspicious process spawning (such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawned from office documents or temporary directories), anomalous outbound network connections from non-browser binaries, and unauthorized modifications to Windows Run keys and scheduled task registries.
How do I remove the Redator Trojan from Windows?
Manual removal of Redator is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Redator a virus or a Trojan?
Redator is classified as a Trojan. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Redator typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Redator infection?
Symptoms of Redator can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Trojans
Want to prevent Redator and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Banking Trojan Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/redator.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.