Netwiredrc

Overview

Trojan:Win32/Netwire (cataloged as NetWiredRC, or simply NetWire) is an infamous cross-platform Remote Access Trojan (RAT) and infostealer that was commercially marketed by WorldWiredLabs before being dismantled in March 2023 in an international law enforcement operation led by the FBI, US Attorney's Office (Central District of California), and Europol. Operating stealthily across Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms, NetWire provides adversaries with complete remote desktop surveillance, multi-browser password and cookie scraping, automated offline and online keystroke logging, reverse command shells, and file transfer capabilities. Extensively deployed by initial access brokers, business email compromise (BEC) operators, and state-sponsored cyber espionage syndicates, NetWire was distributed through spear-phishing campaigns weaponized with malicious document exploits (such as Equation Editor flaws CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802).

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• NetWire
• NetWire RAT
• NetWiredRC
• Trojan:Win32/Netwire
• Backdoor.Netwire
• WorldWiredLabs NetWire
• Trojan.NetWire

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• WorldWiredLabs / Global Cybercrime & BEC Syndicates High confidence
  Basis:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Netwire V1.X · Netwire V3.X Cross-Platform Build · Worldwiredlabs Commercial Build

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.
• T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2018-0802 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b
• 5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d

Delivery vectors

• spearphishing_attachments
• malicious_invoice_documents

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
• AppData directory hidden log files

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_NETWIREDRC_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Netwiredrc"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "netwiredrc" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "netwire rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "netwiredrc" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan:win32/netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "backdoor.netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "worldwiredlabs netwire" ascii wide nocase
        $s8 = "trojan.netwire" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Netwiredrc (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 9e438e63-e88b-5a8c-9783-f5a02b4f2571
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Netwiredrc malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via
  Windows Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative
  of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/netwiredrc
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1125
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_NETWIREDRC_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Netwiredrc tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "netwiredrc" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate suspect workstations from the corporate network to prevent live operator surveillance.
2. Capture volatile memory to extract the unencrypted NetWire C2 configuration, ports, and encryption keys.
3. Reset credentials for all email accounts, banking interfaces, and VPN logins accessed from the host.
4. Deploy security updates patching Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow unmonitored TCP egress connections over non-standard ports from corporate endpoints.
2. Avoid opening unsolicited commercial billing attachments without sandbox inspection.
3. Never assume an infection is benign; NetWire allows real-time interactive command execution.

References & External Analysis

• US Department of Justice: NetWire RAT Infrastructure Seized and Administrator Arrested
• Europol: Coordinated Takedown of NetWire RAT Commercial Infrastructure
• NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2017-11882
• CISA Advisory: AA20-205A
• Search "netwiredrc" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "netwiredrc" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "netwiredrc" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: AA20-205A ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Rebhip
• Bifrost
• Recam
• Farfli
• Rescoms
• Apocalypse_Rat
• Immirat
• Asyncrat

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/netwiredrc.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.