Razy
Table of Contents
Overview
Razy (cataloged across cybersecurity research as Trojan:Win32/Razy, Trojan.Win32.Razy, and Trojan.Razy.gen) is a sophisticated Windows trojan and information stealer specialized in compromising web browsers, hijacking cryptocurrency transactions, and installing persistent rogue browser extensions. First analyzed in depth by Kaspersky in 2018, Razy targets Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Yandex Browser by patching internal browser dynamic-link libraries (such as chrome.dll) to permanently disable extension integrity verification and automatic security updates. It then forcefully installs rogue extensions (or subverts legitimate system components like the Chrome Media Router) to execute script injection and Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) attacks. Razy continuously monitors browsing activity on cryptocurrency exchange and wallet portals, replacing destination Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Monero wallet addresses in the user's clipboard or active DOM fields with threat-actor controlled addresses. Razy droppers are heavily distributed through malicious software cracks, keygens, and malvertising campaigns weaponizing CVE-2018-0802 and CVE-2017-11882.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Man-In-The-Browser Infostealer Frameworks
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Razy.A · Razy.Chromiumpatcher · Razy.Cryptoclipper
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-PBA | Process Spawn Analysis | Detect | T1059.003 | Inspect command-line arguments and anomalous parent-child relationships spawning from cmd.exe. |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-CAC | Clipboard Access Control | Isolate | T1115 | Isolate virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) clipboards and alert on rapid background clipboard querying by non-foreground processes. |
D3-BEA | Browser Extension Allowlisting | Harden | T1176 | Deploy enterprise browser policies via GPO or Intune to block unauthorized side-loaded extensions and add-ons. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
D3-CVH | Credential Vault Hardening | Harden | T1555.003 | Enable DPAPI master key audit logging and isolate browser SQLite database files within virtualization-based security containers. |
D3-STA | Security Tool Anti-Tamper Enforcement | Harden | T1562.001 | Block unauthorized modification of antivirus registry flags and prevent stopping security agent services. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2018-0802 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c38d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e
Delivery vectors
Spear-phishing emails delivering malicious RTF/Word attachments exploiting CVE-2018-0802Deceptive websites hosting trojanized key generators and torrent utilities
Persistence mechanisms
Modified chrome.dll in Google Chrome program files directoryRogue browser extensions installed in user Chrome and Firefox profilesHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\RazyUpdater
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_RAZY_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Razy"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "razy" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "trojan:win32/razy" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan.win32.razy" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "trojan.razy.gen" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "win32/razy.stealer" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "trojan.razy" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Razy (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: a420ef9b-3828-5e03-a625-d97c228424d5
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Razy malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting, master
key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/razy
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1176
- attack.t1115
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \rundll32.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
- \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
- \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
- vaultcmd.exe /list
- dpapi
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_RAZY_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Razy tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "razy" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Immediately disconnect infected endpoints from networks to stop active cryptocurrency transaction tampering.
- Uninstall all compromised web browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Yandex) and delete corresponding profile folders under %LOCALAPPDATA%.
- Reinstall fresh browser copies from official vendor sources to restore unpatched browser DLL integrity.
- Move remaining cryptocurrency assets from any wallet used on the compromised system to a new secure hardware wallet.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not execute software cracks, keygens, or unauthorized torrent packages on systems used for cryptocurrency transactions.
- Avoid relying solely on basic file deletion without reinstalling tampered browser binaries.
References & External Analysis
- Kaspersky Securelist - Trojan.Win32.Razy Analysis and Browser Extension Subversion
- Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Trojan:Win32/Razy
- NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2018-0802
- Search "razy" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "razy" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "razy" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Razy malware family?
Razy is a Windows infostealer that patches browser core libraries to install rogue extensions and hijack cryptocurrency wallet transactions.
How does Razy hijack cryptocurrency payments?
It monitors clipboard and web form inputs, replacing legitimate crypto addresses with attacker-controlled addresses during transactions.
How does Razy bypass Google Chrome extension security checks?
It modifies and patches chrome.dll, disabling digital signature validation and auto-updates to force acceptance of rogue plugins.
Which CVE vulnerabilities have been linked to Razy distribution?
Campaigns distributing Razy droppers have exploited Microsoft Office Equation Editor flaws including CVE-2018-0802 and CVE-2017-11882.
How can systems be completely remediated from Razy?
Clean the malware using antivirus software, completely reinstall affected web browsers, and transfer cryptocurrency assets to fresh secure wallets.
How do I remove the Razy Infostealer from Windows?
Manual removal of Razy is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Razy a virus or a Infostealer?
Razy is classified as a Infostealer. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Razy typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Razy infection?
Symptoms of Razy can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Infostealers
Want to prevent Razy and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: InfoStealer Protection & Remediation.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/razy.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.