Maener

Overview

Maener (cataloged by security vendors as Trojan:Win32/Maener, Trojan.Win32.Maener, Worm:Win32/Maener, and Bindmaener) is a persistent cryptocurrency mining trojan and resource hijacker that emerged in 2017 during the peak of the Monero cryptojacking wave. Maener's primary objective is the stealthy exploitation of victim endpoint computing hardware (CPU and GPU) to mine cryptocurrencies without user consent. Deployed through multi-stage droppers (such as TrojanDropper:Win32/Bindmaener) and weaponized freeware installers, Maener injects open-source mining engines (such as XMRig derivatives) into legitimate Windows processes. To evade detection, Maener throttles mining resource usage when users become active or when Task Manager is opened, and modifies Windows Firewall rules to permit outbound stratum mining pool connections. In lateral spreading campaigns, Maener variants have exploited SMB vulnerabilities including CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue).

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Maener
• Trojan.Win32.Maener
• Worm:Win32/Maener
• Bindmaener
• Win32/Maener.Miner

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Cryptocurrency Mining Droppers

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Maener.A · Bindmaener · Maener.Miner

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-0144 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e
• 0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a

Delivery vectors

• Secondary droppers bundled within cracked software installers and game modification utilities
• Network propagation via SMB exploitation using CVE-2017-0144

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MaenerService
• Windows Scheduled Task registered to run miner payload every 15 minutes

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_MAENER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Maener"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "maener" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/maener" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan.win32.maener" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "worm:win32/maener" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "bindmaener" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/maener.miner" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Maener (Cryptominer) Execution & Triage
id: bf31216d-60e4-5547-94f8-3e6f6682e262
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Maener malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/maener
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.cryptominer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1496
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_MAENER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Maener tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "maener" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Terminate unauthorized mining processes and injected host processes immediately.
2. Delete dropped mining binaries located in %APPDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% directories.
3. Remove persistent scheduled tasks and registry Run entries created by Bindmaener.
4. Block outbound network connections to public cryptocurrency mining pools and stratum proxies.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow unmonitored outbound traffic on high-port mining protocols from corporate workstations.
2. Avoid downloading unauthorized software utilities, game mods, or key generators from untrusted sites.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Trojan:Win32/Maener
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-0144
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2010-2568
• Search "maener" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "maener" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "maener" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Cryptominer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Coins
• Tiggre
• Xmrig
• Neksminer

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/maener.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.